State v. Blevins, 118639

Background

Blevins and Tammy Akers were the only occupants of an Escalade that ran a stop sign, crashed into a van, and killed two people; both had used alcohol and methamphetamine and each blamed the other for driving.
Tammy and her husband paid Tammy's longtime lawyer, Carl Maughan, a $30,000 flat fee to represent Blevins; Maughan had a longstanding attorney–client relationship with Tammy and also represented her in a contemporaneous traffic matter.
Maughan did not retain a DNA expert, accident reconstructionist, or medical expert despite Blevins’ requests; some forensic results implicated Tammy and were inconclusive as to Blevins.
At trial Maughan cross‑examined Tammy and argued Blevins was not the driver; a jury convicted Blevins of multiple counts and he was sentenced to lengthy prison time.
On remand for a Van Cleave hearing on ineffective assistance/conflict claims, the district court found no prejudicial conflict or that any conflict was waived; the appellate panel reversed, finding actual conflicts that were not knowingly waived and that adversely affected representation.

Issues

Issue	Blevins' Argument	State/Maughan's Argument	Held
Whether Maughan's prior and concurrent representation of Tammy created a conflict	Prior and ongoing representation of Tammy (and her status as the key witness/potential suspect) created an active conflict that limited Maughan's loyalty and investigation	Representation of Tammy in an unrelated traffic matter did not create a concurrent conflict; any conflict was waived in writing/orally	Court: Actual conflict existed (past and concurrent ties + Tammy's role) and adversely affected performance; waiver insufficient; supports reversal and remand
Whether third‑party payment (Tammy/Greg paying fees) created a conflict and whether waiver was valid	Payment by Tammy/Greg created a conflict requiring informed written waiver under KRPC 1.8 and impaired loyalty	Court below found written/oral waivers and fee arrangement acceptable and not prejudicial	Court: Fee payment created a conflict; no adequate written waiver addressing the payment/impact; conflict adversely affected representation
Whether flat‑fee arrangement created a conflict that impaired defense (investigation, experts, plea negotiations, strategy)	Flat fee disincentivized hiring experts/investigation and disfavored early plea resolution, reducing zealous representation	Maughan said fee did not affect plea efforts or decision to proceed to preliminary hearing; fee was reasonable	Court: Flat fee created a financial disincentive that likely discouraged pursuing experts/investigation (notably harmful here); this contributed to adverse effect on representation
Whether the extra blood vial seized exceeded the warrant and required suppression	Police seized three vials though warrant authorized two — seizure exceeded scope and required suppression	Officers made an inadvertent, good‑faith mistake; only first two vials were used at trial so no suppression required	Court: No flagrant disregard; good‑faith mistake and State used only the first two vials — admission of blood evidence was not error

Key Cases Cited

State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117 (1986) (framework for remanding ineffective‑assistance/conflict claims to district court)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance based on deficient performance)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (standard for conflicts of interest and presumed prejudice if an actual conflict adversely affects counsel's performance)
State v. Cheatham, 296 Kan. 417 (2013) (analysis of flat‑fee conflicts and when fee structure can adversely affect counsel's performance)
State v. Stovall, 298 Kan. 362 (2013) (recognizing perils of successive/joint representation and presumption of adverse effect in certain conflict contexts)
State v. Jackson, 52 Kan. App. 2d 125 (2015) (requirements for a knowing, voluntary waiver of conflict‑free counsel)