State v. Blazina, 344 P.3d 680

Background

Nicholas Blazina and Mauricio Paige-Colter were sentenced to prison and ordered to pay discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) under RCW 10.01.160(3); neither defendant objected at sentencing.
Trial courts used boilerplate judgments stating the courts had considered ability to pay, but the sentencing records contain no individualized inquiry into current or future ability to pay.
Both defendants raised the adequacy of the courts’ ability-to-pay inquiry for the first time on appeal; the Court of Appeals declined to reach the claims under RAP 2.5.
The Washington Supreme Court granted review, exercised its RAP 2.5 discretion to reach the merits, and considered national/state evidence about harms caused by LFOs on indigent defendants.
The Court held RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the sentencing court to make an individualized, on-the-record inquiry into a defendant’s current and future ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs and remanded for resentencing because the record lacked that inquiry.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether appellate courts must refuse review of unpreserved LFO claims	Blazina/Paige-Colter: sentencing errors may be raised on appeal even if unpreserved (citing Ford)	State: defendants waived by not objecting; issue ripe only when collection sought	Court: Court of Appeals properly declined discretionary review under RAP 2.5, but Supreme Court exercised its own discretion to reach the merits
Whether RCW 10.01.160(3) requires an individualized ability-to-pay inquiry before imposing discretionary LFOs	Defendants: statute requires individualized inquiry into current and future ability to pay and the record must reflect it	State: issue not ripe; collection stage is proper time to challenge	Held: statute’s use of “shall” is mandatory — sentencing court must inquire into financial resources and burdens and the record must reflect that inquiry
Scope of required inquiry and factors to consider	Defendants: courts must consider incarceration, other debts, restitution, and future ability to pay	State: (implicit) courts need not make detailed findings beyond boilerplate	Held: courts must consider important factors (e.g., incarceration, other debts including restitution) and may use GR 34 indigency guidance; boilerplate is insufficient
Whether unpreserved LFO errors fall within Ford’s sentencing-error exception	Defendants: Ford permits unpreserved sentencing challenges on appeal as of right	State: Ford does not apply here	Held: Ford’s narrow exception applies to errors that threaten sentencing uniformity (e.g., offender score); it does not automatically permit review of discretionary LFO impositions

Key Cases Cited

State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472 (1999) (recognized narrow circumstances where unpreserved sentencing errors may be raised on appeal)
State v. Jones, 182 Wn.2d 1 (2014) (discussing Ford and scope of review for unpreserved sentencing errors)
State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 (2009) (three-part test for invoking RAP 2.5(a)(3) manifest constitutional error exception)
State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739 (2008) (community custody conditions and review of sentencing issues)
State v. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d 913 (2009) (offender score/prior convictions sentencing error reviewed on appeal)
State v. Russell, 171 Wn.2d 118 (2011) (appellate courts’ discretion under RAP 2.5 to review unpreserved issues)
State v. Davis, 175 Wn.2d 287 (2012) (purpose of RAP 2.5 and importance of preserving issues at trial)
State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736 (1999) (court’s authority to secure fair and orderly review and to waive rules in interest of justice)