State v. Blansett
309 Kan. 401
| Kan. | 2019Background
- In December 2014 Lindsey Blansett stabbed her 10-year-old son to death, called 911, and was arrested; she admitted killing him but said she "lost [her] mind."
- At trial the State relied on investigators and recordings; defense presented Dr. Jarrod Steffan (bipolar manic/psychosis) and the State called Dr. Roy Daum (brief psychotic episode) to rebut
- Defense theory: Blansett suffered a mental disease or defect that affected her ability to form premeditation and intent; evidence included delusional beliefs, sleep/mood disturbance, and contemporaneous statements
- Jury instructions included Instruction No. 6 (mental disease or defect defense) stating such evidence is to be considered only to determine whether the defendant had the culpable mental state and that she is not criminally responsible if, because of mental disease or defect, she lacked premeditation and intent
- During deliberations the jury asked for a definition of "culpable," and the court answered that the culpable mental state for first-degree murder and second-degree murder is "intentionally" (and for aggravated assault "knowingly")
- Jury convicted Blansett of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault; she appealed challenging the mental-disease instruction, the court’s response to the jury question, and several alleged prosecutorial errors
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Blansett) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury instructions prevented consideration of mental disease affecting premeditation | Instruction No. 6 and the court's response foreclosed jury from considering mental disease to negate premeditation | Instructions, read as a whole, allowed consideration; McLinn holds premeditation is not a "culpable mental state" under §21-5209 | Affirmed: no reversible instructional error; McLinn controls; instructions did not prevent jury from considering mental disease re: premeditation |
| Whether premeditation is a "culpable mental state" negatable by mental-disease defense | Premeditation can be negated by proof of mental disease affecting the defendant's ability to premeditate | Under K.S.A. §21-5202(a)/§21-5209, culpable mental states are intentionally/knowingly/recklessly; McLinn rejects premeditation as a culpable mental state | McLinn controls: premeditation is not a culpable mental state for §21-5209 purposes |
| Whether prosecutor committed reversible error in closing (burden-shifting / misstatements) | Multiple prosecutorial misstatements shifted burden and misstated evidence, warranting reversal | Most comments were responsive to defense argument; only one misstatement (suggesting defendant testified) occurred and was promptly corrected | One prosecutorial error (misstating that Blansett testified) found but harmless given immediate correction and context |
| Whether cumulative errors require reversal | Multiple errors compounded to prejudice Blansett's rights | Only one harmless prosecutorial error plus no reversible instructional error | No cumulative error; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 409 P.3d 1 (2018) (holding premeditation is not a "culpable mental state" under K.S.A. §21-5209)
- State v. Marks, 297 Kan. 131, 298 P.3d 1102 (2013) (warning that equating formation of intent with premeditation can misstate law)
- State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (discussing when prosecutors may respond regarding defense subpoena power and scope of rebuttal)
- State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016) (two-step prosecutorial error analysis: error and prejudice; Chapman harmlessness test applies)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (constitutional harmless error test)