State v. Blair Olsen, 161 Idaho 385

Background

Blair Olsen was Jefferson County sheriff (1989–2015). County provided him two county-paid cell phones; he later transferred his personal number to the backup phone and allowed his wife to carry it for a period.
Commissioners learned of the wife’s use in 2012, investigated, concluded the use did not increase county costs, adopted a cell-phone policy, and issued a public statement; Olsen asked them to seek an Attorney General opinion.
A deputy attorney general indicted Olsen on three felony counts (2010, 2011, 2012) for knowingly using public moneys for personal purposes based on his wife’s use of the backup phone; jury convicted on all three counts.
District court withheld judgment, placed Olsen on probation, and Olsen appealed.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed one conviction but held the State improperly charged three aggregated counts and remanded to vacate two convictions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Separation of powers: was prosecution improper because commissioners approved use?	State: prosecutions for criminal violations remain a judicial/executive matter despite local approvals.	Olsen: commissioners’ decision that the phone had public benefit precludes prosecution; courts must defer to coordinate branch.	Rejected Olsen’s claim—commissioners lacked authority to absolve criminal liability; prosecution did not violate separation of powers.
Vagueness of statute ("personal purpose")	State: statute provides sufficient contrast between public/governmental and personal; contains scienter.	Olsen: term "personal purpose" is undefined, could criminalize incidental/insignificant uses; vague as applied and facially.	Statute not unconstitutionally vague; scienter requirement and contextual contrast supply adequate notice and enforcement guidance.
Double jeopardy / multiplicity: multiple counts for continuous conduct	State: each aggregated charging period (2010, 2011, 2012) constituted separate violations subject to separate punishment.	Olsen: wife’s continuous use was one ongoing decision; charging three counts punished the same offense multiple times.	Double jeopardy not violated because statute criminalizes each separate purchase/payment; multiple violations can be punished separately.
Proper aggregation under I.C. §18-5702(4)(a)	State: could aggregate payments into counts by year to reach statutory thresholds.	Olsen: either must aggregate all related incidents into one count or the jury must find separate incidents/common scheme before aggregation.	Court held the statute requires that when the State elects to aggregate a series in a common scheme, it must aggregate all incidents into one count; vacated two convictions and remanded.

Key Cases Cited

Spanton v. Clapp, 299 P.2d 1103 (Idaho 1956) (separation of powers: defining departmental roles in criminal law enforcement)
Boudreau v. City of Wendell, 213 P.3d 394 (Idaho 2009) (local governments cannot override statutes)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (void-for-vagueness doctrine and enforcement guidance)
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (scienter requirements alleviate vagueness concerns)
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (facial vagueness challenge requires showing statute vague in all applications)
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (Double Jeopardy Clause protections defined)
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (rejection of single-transaction double jeopardy rule)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (test for separate offenses when same statute is charged multiple times)
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (double jeopardy and cumulative sentencing reflect legislative intent)
State v. Anderson, 175 P.3d 788 (Idaho rule of lenity: criminal statutes strictly construed in defendant’s favor)
State v. Lloyd, 647 P.2d 1254 (jury determines if incidents are part of a common scheme or plan)