801 S.E.2d 713
S.C.2017Background
- Defendant Ricky Lee Blackwell abducted and fatally shot eight-year-old Heather Brooke Center in July 2009; he was indicted for kidnapping and murder, convicted by a jury, and the jury recommended death.
- Defense raised an Atkins claim (mental retardation/intellectual disability); the trial court held a pretrial Franklin hearing with competing experts and found Blackwell failed to prove mental retardation by a preponderance.
- At trial the jury found Blackwell not mentally retarded on a special verdict form, found two statutory aggravators (victim under eleven; murder committed during kidnapping), and recommended death; the trial court imposed death.
- Post-trial, Blackwell appealed, challenging (inter alia) the pretrial Atkins eligibility ruling, qualification of a juror, denial of a Batson challenge to certain peremptory strikes, exclusion/refusal to review the victim’s wife’s privileged mental-health records for impeachment, exclusion of hospital chaplains’ notes, and penalty-phase jury instructions on mental retardation.
- The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed convictions and sentence but (1) upheld the trial court’s Atkins ruling under a deferential standard, (2) adopted procedures for in-camera review of a witness’s mental-health records when privilege conflicts with confrontation rights, and (3) clarified allocation/standards for mental-retardation issues at penalty phase.
Issues
| Issue | Blackwell’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pretrial Atkins eligibility | Blackwell argued he was mentally retarded and thus ineligible for death; evidence (IQ scores, expert opinion) proved it by preponderance | Trial court and State argued evidence did not preponderate; pretrial ruling was supported by the record | Affirmed: trial court’s pretrial Atkins determination will be upheld if supported by the evidence and not against its preponderance; here defendant failed to meet burden. |
| Juror qualification (Juror 43) | Juror 43 should have been struck for cause for views about mitigation and burden | State/trial court argued juror affirmed willingness to follow law and apply mitigating evidence | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; voir dire viewed as a whole showed juror could follow instructions. |
| Batson challenge to peremptory strikes (Jurors 45 & 79) | Strikes were pretextual and race-based (comparator caucasian jurors had similar records/views) | State gave race-neutral reasons (criminal records; pro-life/preference for life sentence); comparators not similarly situated on voir dire answers | Affirmed: trial court’s step-3 Batson credibility determination not clearly erroneous; comparators had meaningful distinctions. |
| Use of State witness’s privileged mental-health records for impeachment/confrontation | Blackwell claimed Confrontation Clause entitled him to in-camera review and use of Angela’s counseling records to impeach/attack bias | State/witness invoked statutory privilege and privacy; trial court initially ordered screened disclosure but later refused to review or admit proffered records | Court held trial court erred in refusing in-camera review and in finding privilege absolute; adopts procedure: judge must hold a hearing, determine consent, and (if no consent) review records in camera upon a minimal preliminary showing that they likely contain impeachment/exculpatory material; nevertheless, in this case any error was harmless. |
| Admissibility of hospital chaplains’ notes (mitigation) | Notes showed contemporaneous remorse and were business/medical records admissible under exception; exclusion violated Eighth Amendment right to present mitigating evidence | State argued hearsay; notes contained subjective opinions and chaplains could testify; trial court excluded under hearsay rules | Affirmed exclusion as within discretion (subjective opinions excluded under business-records rule); if error, it was harmless because notes were cumulative to other mitigation evidence. |
| Penalty-phase jury instruction and burden re: mental retardation | Blackwell argued jury should be instructed that State must prove defendant is not mentally retarded beyond a reasonable doubt or that no burden should be on defendant to prove mental retardation at penalty phase | State and trial court treated Atkins as threshold affirmative defense for which defendant bears burden by preponderance at pretrial and may present to jury; absence of retardation is not an aggravator | Affirmed and clarified: defendant bears burden by preponderance to prove mental retardation (threshold); if jury finds not mentally retarded, it may nonetheless consider evidence of intellectual functioning as mitigation without any burden of proof. |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of mentally retarded persons violates Eighth Amendment)
- Franklin v. Maynard, 356 S.C. 276 (S.C. 2003) (South Carolina procedure for pretrial Atkins determinations; defendant bears burden by preponderance)
- Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (IQ score cutoff cannot foreclose broader inquiry into adaptive functioning for Atkins claims)
- Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. _ (2017) (U.S. Supreme Court rejecting nonclinical Briseno factors; adaptive-functioning inquiry must align with current clinical standards)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (three-step test for racially motivated peremptory strikes)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (Confrontation Clause—scope of cross-examination and harmless-error analysis)
- State v. Laney, 367 S.C. 639 (S.C. 2006) (absence of mental retardation is a threshold eligibility issue for capital punishment)
- State v. Stanko, 402 S.C. 252 (S.C. 2013) (discussing statutory definition and Atkins adaptive-functioning requirement)