State v. Blackman
886 N.W.2d 94
Wis. Ct. App.2016Background
- On June 22, 2013 Adam M. Blackman turned left in front of a bicyclist, causing great bodily harm; officer Abler concluded Blackman failed to yield but had no probable cause to suspect impairment.
- Under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. (2009 amendment), an officer may request blood when an accident causes death or great bodily harm and there is reason to believe a traffic law was violated — no suspicion of impairment required.
- Abler read the statutory "Informing the Accused" form warning that refusal would lead to statutory revocation of Blackman’s license; Blackman consented and blood test showed BAC .10.
- Blackman was criminally charged (including OWI-related counts) and moved to suppress the blood-test results, arguing his consent was coerced because the refusal/hearing statutes do not align with § 343.305(3)(ar)2. and a refusal revocation would be "statutorily unenforceable."
- The circuit court granted suppression, concluding consent was coerced; the State appealed.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding Blackman made a voluntary choice to give actual consent and therefore his consent was not coerced despite the statutory mismatch.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Blackman's consent to blood draw was coerced by the implied-consent statutory scheme | Blackman: The Informing the Accused warning misled him because refusal revocations under § 343.305(3)(ar)2. would be unenforceable, so his consent was coerced | State: Driver has impliedly consented by driving; officer gave a statutory choice — submit (actual consent) or refuse and face statutory revocation — so consent was voluntary | Court held consent was voluntary; no coercion because the choice to submit or refuse was Blackman’s alone |
| Whether the statutory "disconnect" between the 2009 amendment and refusal-hearing statutes renders consent invalid | Blackman: Because refusal revocations would likely be reversed at a hearing, the threat coerced consent | State: The possibility of prevailing at a later hearing does not negate the immediate statutory consequence or convert voluntary consent into coercion | Court held the mismatch does not make consent coerced; success at a refusal hearing does not transform a voluntary choice into coercion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545 (2014) (upheld § 343.305(3)(ar)2. and explained difference between implied and actual consent)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Fourth Amendment consent need only be voluntary, not necessarily knowing and intelligent)
- State v. Spring, 204 Wis. 2d 343 (1996) (implied consent law is remedial and to be liberally construed)
- State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191 (1980) (consent is implied by driving and may be withdrawn only with legislatively imposed sanction)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (distinguishes breath and blood tests re: criminal penalties; noted but not outcome-determinative here)