State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533

Defendants Bishop and Torres pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin within 1,000 feet of school property under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 and were eligible for mandatory extended terms under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f.
Plea agreements permitted Drug Court special probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a with an alternate seven-year prison sentence and a 42-month parole disqualifier; this formed the extended-term option.
After partial success on special probation, each defendant violated probation and permanent revocation was agreed; VOP resentencings were requested by the State.
Court re-set aggravating/mitigating factors and imposed seven-year terms with 42- and 36-month parole disqualifiers, respectively.
Defendants argued the State, by consenting to special probation, irrevocably waived the extended-term option and that Baylass/Lagares/Vasquez/Peters controls barred parole disqualifiers at VOP.
The court concluded N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14f(4) creates a separate VOP resentencing regime for special probation, preserving original sentencing mechanisms and allowing reasonable discretion for parole ineligibility.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Baylass framework governs special probation VOP resentencing	Bishop argues original aggravators govern resentencing.	Bishop contends no more than Baylass limits apply.	Baylass framework applies with discretionary parole ineligibility in appropriate cases.
Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14f(4) preserves original sentencing provisions at VOP	Court should adopt original terms as baseline.	Statute preserves original sentencing features for special probation.	N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14f(4) preserves and de novo reviews aggravating/mitigating factors.
Whether prosecutor waiver of parole disqualifier binds at VOP for special probation	Defendants claim waiver forecloses VOP extended term.	State argued waiver at original sentencing prevents later enforcement.	Waiver authority does not negate VOP resentencing under 2C:35-14f(4); separate regime applies.
Role of the Drug Court framework and Brimage guidelines in VOP sentencing	Drug Court program should limit harsh penalties on revocation.	Guidelines should constrain but not prevent harsh terms when warranted.	Drug Court objectives support uniformity but do not bar discretionary parole ineligibility.
Whether the 2012 amendment affecting prosecutor role changes the waiver premise	Waiver premise remains viable.	2012 amendment eliminates prosecutor’s veto/waiver premise for special probation.	2012 amendment confirms no waiver premise affects VOP resentencing; 14f(4) remains intact.

State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998) (uniformity goals in sentencing; Brimage guidelines)
State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169 (1989) (aggravating/mitigating factors at original sentencing govern post-VOP)
State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992) (uniform guidelines for prosecutorial discretion in extended terms)
State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189 (1992) (parole disqualifier waivable; Baylass framework extended to school-zone offenses)
State v. Peters, 129 N.J. 210 (1992) (related to school-zone and parole ineligibility considerations)
State v. Clarke, 203 N.J. 166 (2010) (distinguishes Drug Court tracks and probation)
State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421 (2007) (Drug Court eligibility and sentencing distinctions)
State v. Soricelli, 156 N.J. 525 (1999) (presumption of imprisonment for higher-degree offenses)
State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005) (parole ineligibility considerations in related contexts)