State v. Billingsley
309 Neb. 616
| Neb. | 2021Background
- State charged William Billingsley III on Sept. 3, 2019 with first-degree assault, third-degree assault, and disturbing the peace.
- Billingsley filed a plea in abatement on Aug. 28, 2019; it was denied Dec. 5, 2019 (93 days excluded from speedy-trial computation).
- COVID-19 caused telephonic pretrial conferences and delayed jury assembly; court set trial for June 30, 2020 following a June 1 scheduling conference.
- On June 25, 2020 the prosecutor (seeking testimony from three doctors) tested positive for COVID-19 and filed a motion to continue; the court granted the continuance over Billingsley’s objection.
- Billingsley moved for absolute discharge on Aug. 11, 2020 as beyond the six-month statutory deadline; the district court denied the motion after excluding multiple time periods.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the State proved an additional 46-day exclusion (June 26–Aug. 11, 2020) based on the prosecuting attorney’s continuance motion, making the trial deadline Sept. 14, 2020.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Billingsley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the period Apr 6–Jun 26, 2020 (COVID-related scheduling) is excludable for good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f) | COVID restrictions and planning justified exclusion; court may find good cause | Court/journal entries alone insufficient evidence for exclusion | Court assumed arguendo but did not decide; not dispositive because other exclusion controlled outcome |
| Whether the continuance granted Jun 26–Aug 11, 2020 is excludable under § 29-1207(4)(c)(i) for unavailability of material evidence | Prosecutor’s affidavit showed material medical witnesses unavailable, due diligence, and reasonable belief testimony would be later available | Affidavit and circumstances insufficient to toll speedy-trial; State’s deadline expired | Held excludable under § 29-1207(4)(c)(i); affidavit satisfied requirements |
| Whether the continuance is excludable under § 29-1207(4)(c)(ii) because exceptional circumstances justified additional time to prepare | Prosecutor’s COVID diagnosis days before trial and related witness issues were exceptional and justified extra time | Exceptional-circumstances tolling unwarranted; delay should be taxed to State | Held excludable under § 29-1207(4)(c)(ii); court did not abuse discretion in granting continuance |
| Who bears burden to prove excludable time and standard of review on appeal | State must prove excluded periods by preponderance; trial-court factual findings reviewed for clear error | Billingsley argued State failed burden for relevant exclusions | Held State met its burden for the controlling exclusion; appellate court affirms absent clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (Neb. 2021) (trial-court speedy-trial findings are factual and reviewed for clear error)
- State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443, 949 N.W.2d 490 (Neb. 2020) (speedy-trial computation method)
- State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (Neb. 2019) (effect of excluded periods on statutory deadline)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (Neb. 2009) (periods between filing and disposition of pretrial motions are excludable)
- State v. Turner, 252 Neb. 620, 564 N.W.2d 231 (Neb. 1997) (continuance rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29, 881 N.W.2d 864 (Neb. 2016) (§ 29-1207(4)(c)(ii) exceptional-circumstances guidance)
- State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245, 609 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 2000) (evidence required to support exclusion determinations)