State v. Betterman
2015 MT 39
Mont.2015Background
- Betterman failed to appear at trial dates for a partner/family member assault; he surrendered Feb 9, 2012 and was later charged with bail jumping.
- He pleaded guilty to bail jumping at arraignment on April 19, 2012; the State also filed a persistent felony offender (PFO) notice, which Betterman later contested.
- The court ordered an updated PSI on May 3, 2012; the PSI was completed Oct 10, 2012; sentencing was not held until June 27, 2013 — about 14 months after the guilty plea.
- During the interim Betterman filed an objection to the PFO notice and a motion to dismiss for speedy-trial/sentencing delay; the district court denied dismissal and proceeded to sentence him to seven years (four suspended), consecutive to an earlier 5-year sentence.
- Betterman appealed, arguing the 14-month delay between guilty plea and sentencing violated his speedy-trial rights; the State argued he waived speedy-trial protections by pleading guilty and that any delay should be evaluated under due process/statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right covers delay from conviction to sentencing | State: speedy-trial right ends at disposition; any delay is a due process/statutory matter | Betterman: speedy-trial right continues through sentencing; plea does not waive post-plea speedy-trial claims | Court: Speedy-trial right does not extend through sentencing; Mooney overruled insofar as it held otherwise |
| Proper constitutional standard for post-conviction sentencing delay | State: apply due process considerations (Fourteenth Amendment) | Betterman: applied Ariegwe speedy-trial balancing | Court: apply due process (Lovasco framework) to unreasonable sentencing delay |
| Whether 14-month delay violated due process (reasons for delay) | State: much delay attributable to defense motions and PSI; no deliberate state tactic | Betterman: delay was institutional and the court/State were responsible | Court: delay was institutional/unacceptable but not purposeful or oppressive |
| Whether Betterman suffered prejudice sufficient to violate due process | State: prejudice not shown | Betterman: loss of program access, conditional release timing, anxiety, health impacts | Court: prejudice was speculative, not substantial or demonstrable; no due process violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (U.S. 1957) (assumed arguendo that speedy-trial right covers sentencing and analyzed delay must not be purposeful or oppressive)
- United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1971) (speedy-trial protections tied to prejudice and interests the clause protects)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (framework for balancing reasons for delay and prejudice in speedy-trial claims)
- Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (U.S. 1973) (dismissal is the only remedy for a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (distinction between guilt determination at trial and judicial sentencing)
- Lovasco v. United States, 431 U.S. 783 (U.S. 1977) (due process limited role in oppressive delay; both reasons and prejudice matter)
- United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1982) (where Sixth Amendment is inapplicable post-dismissal, due process governs delay concerns)
- State v. Ariegwe, 338 Mont. 442 (Mont. 2007) (speedy-trial analysis applied by Montana courts; discussed in this opinion)
- State v. Mooney, 332 Mont. 249 (Mont. 2006) (previous Montana decision holding speedy-trial right applies through sentencing; overruled in part here)