286 P.3d 402
Wash. Ct. App.2012Background
- On July 11, 2008, Tanisha Barquet was shot outside a Seattle nightclub; Ivory Berube is alleged shooter and Emory Berube is his brother involved in threatening Barquet.
- Barquet identified Emory confronting her; Berube’s gang or associates were present; surveillance video from Waid’s shows Berube signaling or handling a weapon.
- Barquet was wounded severely; Burgess observed movement near the shooter; police later recovered two semiautomatic weapons in a car linked to the Berubes.
- Barquet initially could not identify the shooter but later identified Emory (confronting) and Berube (shooter) in photomontages; Burgess could not identify Berube with certainty.
- Berube was tried on first-degree assault with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm; defense presented testimony from Berube’s mother and Berube himself denying involvement or flight.
- The jury found Berube guilty; various prosecutorial closing arguments challenged on grounds of alleged misconduct and burden-shifting, later appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did closing argument referencing a street antisnitch code constitute misconduct? | Berube argues antisnitch code invoked racial prejudice. | Berube contends the code was race-based and prejudicial. | No misconduct; argument based on evidence, not race. |
| May a prosecutor argue that a defendant tailored his testimony to other witnesses based on direct testimony? | Berube contends tailoring claim requires cross-examination; closing argument improper. | Berube argues tailoring inference is improper or unmoored from evidence. | Not misconduct; tailored- testimony argument permissible when grounded in defendant’s own testimony. |
| Did the prosecutor improperly shift the burden of proof by urging the defendant to provide corroborating witnesses? | Berube asserts prosecution implied defendant bore burden to produce witnesses. | Berube argues missing-witness suggestions shift burden. | Waived; any error curable by instruction; no reversible error. |
| Did prosecutor’s appeals to passion/prejudice (mother’s aftermath) prejudice the trial? | Berube claims inflammatory touching of familial relations biased jurors. | Berube asserts improper appeal to emotions without basis. | Not flagrant or incurable; waived due to lack of objection. |
| Was the ‘puzzle’/reasonable doubt rhetoric improper in misdescribing jury's duties? | Berube contends phrases trivialize burden of proof. | Berube argues the rhetoric misstates duties and distracts from proof standard. | Not improper; not like Johnson; not reversible given instructions and lack of objection. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741 (2012) (harmless error framework for prosecutorial misconduct; pre/postarrest silence considerations)
- State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667 (2011) (constitutional harmless error test for racial-bias arguments)
- Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (1999) (certainty about tailoring arguments; closing argument limits)
- State v. Martin, 171 Wn.2d 521 (2011) (Washington Constitution provides greater protections; tailoring context)
- State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577 (2008) (missing-witness/defendant-control analysis; instruction impact)
- State v. Belgarde, 110 Wn.2d 504 (1988) (limits on inflammatory/narrative prejudicial arguments)
- State v. Miles, 73 Wn.2d 67 (1968) (illustrative rules about prosecutorial argument; prejudice considerations)
- State v. Johnson, 158 Wn. App. 677 (2010) (prohibition on trivializing reasonable doubt through puzzle analogies)
- State v. Bashaw, 158 Wn. App. 677 (2010) (instructional error framework; subsequent overrule in Bashaw context)
- State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17 (2008) (truth-seeking vs. burden of proof; cure-ability of improper remarks)
