State v. Bennett
324 Conn. 744
Conn.2017Background
- On July 10, 2009, Willie Brown was fatally stabbed outside Raffy’s Café in Meriden. Eyewitnesses identified Erick Bennett (defendant) as the stabber; thumb studs with Brown’s DNA were found in Bennett’s vehicle.
- Jennifer Matias observed the scene from across the street, called 911, and later gave a recorded police statement saying a man in a red shirt (matching Bennett) fled but that a man in a yellow shirt (Benjamin) knelt by the victim and exclaimed, “I killed him.” The 911 call was not preserved.
- Matias left Connecticut and was in Puerto Rico; defense counsel could not locate a reliable address and sought a court order directing the state to issue a material-witness certificate/warrant to secure her attendance and sought admission of her recorded police interview.
- The trial court denied (1) defense request to compel out-of-state attendance (citing lack of authority/address under the statute invoked), and (2) admission of Matias’s recorded statement under the residual hearsay exception (found insufficiently reliable and uncorroborated). The jury convicted Bennett of murder.
- Posttrial, Bennett sought leave to file a late motion for a new trial based on a post-verdict audit reporting defects in the state forensic lab; the trial court denied an evidentiary hearing and treated the audit as newly discovered evidence requiring other procedures.
- Bennett appealed, raising claims including denial of compulsory process/right to present a defense, exclusion of two proffered prior statements (Matias and Arroyo’s investigator statement), discovery/in-camera review of police personnel files, cross-examination limits, denial of hearing on new-trial motion, and prosecutorial improprieties.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Bennett's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether court should have compelled out-of-state witness (Matias) attendance under the certificate statute (compulsory process) | Statute procedures are limited and defense invoked wrong statute; court lacked authority to order state to issue a §54‑82j warrant without address | Denied constitutional compulsory-process/right-to-present-defense where court refused to issue a certificate to summon Matias; Matias was material and unavailable | Denial affirmed: defendant failed to show he could designate Matias’s location with reasonable specificity to trigger issuance; no abuse of discretion |
| 2) Whether Matias’s recorded police interview was admissible under the residual hearsay exception | Statement unsatisfactory: multiple hearsay layers, uncorroborated, declarant unavailable for cross-examination; not reliable | Statement was necessary and trustworthy (neutral disinterested eyewitness); exclusion violated right to present a defense | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion — statement lacked indicia of reliability and corroboration required under residual exception |
| 3) Whether portion of Arroyo’s later statement to defense investigator was admissible under Whelan as a prior inconsistent statement | Statement not sufficiently inconsistent with Arroyo’s trial testimony; trial court properly compared investigator statement to trial testimony | Investigator statement contradicted Arroyo’s testimony and should be admitted to impeach and substantively use under Whelan | Affirmed: proffered excerpt was not materially inconsistent with Arroyo’s trial testimony; trial court did not abuse discretion |
| 4) Whether prosecutor’s rebuttal closing improperly impugned defense counsel and denied fair trial | Prosecutor’s rhetorical critique of defense tactics was fair argument tied to evidence and counsel’s choices (e.g., not questioning detectives) | Closing remarks likened defense strategy to ‘‘shotgun’’ tactics and were improper disparagement of counsel (requiring reversal) | Affirmed: comments were permissible rhetorical argument aimed at defense theory and witness choices, distinguished from impermissible attacks on counsel’s integrity |
Key Cases Cited
- Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (U.S. 1967) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process applies to the states)
- Minder v. Georgia, 183 U.S. 559 (U.S. 1902) (state subpoena power does not compel out-of-state witnesses)
- Lancaster v. Green, 175 Ohio St. 203 (Ohio 1963) (defendant must designate out-of-state witness and location with exactitude before court must initiate uniform-act procedures)
- State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (Conn. 1986) (permits substantive use of prior signed inconsistent statements when declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination)
- State v. Albino, 312 Conn. 763 (Conn. 2014) (prosecutor may not disparage defense counsel by implying deliberate deception; distinguishes permissible argument attacking defense theory)
- State v. McClendon, 248 Conn. 572 (Conn. 1999) (residual hearsay exception applied narrowly; lack of cross-examination undermines reliability)
