499 P.3d 783
Or.2021Background
- Victim C was subpoenaed to appear at Kyle Belden’s trial for fourth-degree assault (domestic violence) but did not appear at the courthouse at the appointed time. A passerby, Laherty, had witnessed C’s injuries and reported statements by C about the assault.
- The State sought to admit C’s out-of-court statements (claimed as excited utterances) in lieu of live testimony, arguing C was "unavailable" under Article I, § 11.
- At a morning hearing the State presented pretrial contact efforts and testimony that an investigator knocked at C’s door around the time of trial; the prosecutor argued it had done everything reasonable. The trial court found C "unavailable" and admitted the hearsay; Belden was convicted.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court considered (1) whether constitutional "unavailability" is a legal question and the scope of the State’s burden to show it exhausted reasonably available means, and (2) whether the State met that burden here.
- The Supreme Court reversed: it held (a) unavailability is a question of law; (b) the State’s burden requires showing exhaustion of measures reasonably available after a witness fails to appear (which may include steps that require a short delay); (c) defendant’s refusal of a continuance does not entirely bar appellate challenge; and (d) on these facts the State failed to show it exhausted reasonably available measures (e.g., no attempt shown to call C or contact her probation officer the morning she missed court), so C was not shown to be constitutionally unavailable. Case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Belden's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Standard and review of constitutional "unavailability" under Or. Const. Art I, § 11 | The State relied on its pretrial efforts (subpoena, contacts, door knock) and urged that the witness’s failure to obey a subpoena can establish unavailability | The defendant argued the State must show it exhausted all reasonably available means to produce the witness, including measures available after the witness failed to appear | Court: "Unavailability" is a question of law; State must show it exhausted all reasonably available measures to produce the witness (not limited to pretrial efforts) |
| 2. Whether measures available only after failure to appear (including those requiring delay) count toward exhaustion | The State (and Court of Appeals) downplayed post-failure measures as irrelevant in this case | Belden argued post-failure measures (e.g., calling the witness, contacting probation officer, remedial contempt) are part of the exhaustion inquiry and may require brief delay | Court: Measures reasonably available after a failure to appear—including some that may require delay—are part of the exhaustion inquiry; whether reasonable depends on case circumstances |
| 3. Whether defendant’s objection to a continuance precludes him from challenging unavailability on appeal | The State argued Belden’s refusal of a continuance foreclosed complaint about measures that required delay | Belden argued objection does not bar appellate review, particularly for measures that would not require a continuance | Court: A defendant’s objection to a continuance does not entirely preclude appellate challenge; Harris may preclude specific situations where defendant invited the precise relief, but not categorically here |
| 4. Whether the State exhausted reasonably available measures here | The State asserted its subpoenas, pretrial contacts, and a morning door knock were sufficient | Belden pointed to lack of proof that the State tried to call C or contact her probation officer after she failed to appear | Court: The State failed to show it exhausted reasonably available measures (no evidence it called C or contacted probation officer that morning nor that such steps would be futile); C was not shown to be constitutionally unavailable |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Harris, 362 Or 55 (2017) (holds State must exhaust all reasonably available means to prove constitutional unavailability)
- State v. Herrera, 286 Or 349 (1979) (explains hearsay exception only when declarant truly unavailable and necessity required)
- State v. Campbell, 299 Or 633 (1985) (adopts two-part Roberts test—unavailability and reliability—for Article I, § 11 analysis)
- State v. Iseli, 366 Or 151 (2020) (treats statutory unavailability under OEC 804 as a question of law)
- State v. Moore, 334 Or 328 (2002) (discusses demanding necessity/unavailability standard under Article I, § 11)
- State v. Birchfield, 342 Or 624 (2007) (addresses limits on hearsay admission under confrontation guarantees)
- Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (original two-part federal test for admitting hearsay: unavailability and reliability)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (federal confrontation-clause developments discussed for context)
