State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
Neb.2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; informations filed July 15 (Roger) and July 1 (Allen), 2015.
- Allen’s trial was originally set for the October jury term, later continued; Roger’s trial was set for the November jury term, then joinder was granted November 18 to try them together in February 2016.
- At a January 5, 2016 pretrial conference the court set the joint trial to begin February 1 and discussed that a 5-day trial was expected; Roger’s counsel objected on speedy-trial grounds and was told to file a motion to sever if desired.
- Roger did not move to sever before his statutory 6-month speedy-trial period ran (January 24, 2016); he instead filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27 alleging violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207.
- The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found the codefendant exclusion under § 29-1207(4)(e) applied (excluding 8 days between Jan 24 and Feb 1), and denied discharge; Roger appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Beitel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 29-1207(4)(e) requires a unitary speedy-trial clock tied to the co‑defendant with the most time remaining | Statute should be read like federal Speedy Trial Act to apply the longest remaining time to all joined defendants | § 29-1207(4)(e) protects each defendant’s personal speedy‑trial right; joining should not automatically extend a defendant’s clock | Court rejected a unitary clock; Nebraska statute protects personal rights and differs from the federal statute |
| Whether defendant waived speedy‑trial rights by not filing a pre‑expiration motion to sever | Failure to move to sever before expiration should be treated as waiver so severance relief could have been granted earlier | Failure to move to sever does not waive the right to speedy trial; defendant preserved right and could choose to move for discharge after time expired | Court held failing to seek severance before the clock ran only forecloses severance relief, but does not waive the speedy‑trial right |
| Proper method to compute excluded time under § 29-1207(4)(e) when joint trial is set for a date certain | Trial court used the longer co‑defendant calculation (Allen) rather than Roger’s shorter calculation | Compute defendant’s own 6‑month period first, then measure days beyond that date to joint trial start | Court agreed: calculate Roger’s own expiration then measure days between that expiration and the set joint trial date (8 days excluded) |
| Whether the State proved (by preponderance) the two factual elements: reasonableness of delay and good cause for not granting severance | The 8‑day delay to a February 1 trial was reasonable and there was good cause to deny severance based on scheduling, expected 5‑day trial length, and lack of available week‑long jury settings | The delay was unreasonable because earlier dates were allegedly available; severance should have been granted | Court found no clear error: 8‑day delay was reasonable and record supported a substantial reason (good cause) not to sever; denial of discharge affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (discussion of Nebraska speedy‑trial act history and ABA Standards)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (statutory interpretation principles)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (State’s burden to prove excluded periods)
- State v. Betancourt‑Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (method for computing 6‑month period)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (definition of good cause in related speedy‑trial context)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (federal unitary speedy‑trial clock doctrine under federal Speedy Trial Act)