State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
Neb.2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were separately charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen's information filed July 1, 2015, Roger's July 15, 2015.
- Allen waived his speedy-trial right at an October hearing and his trial was continued; the State moved to join their cases and joinder was granted in November 2015.
- At a January 5, 2016 pretrial conference the joint trial was set to begin February 1, 2016; Roger’s counsel objected on speedy-trial grounds (Roger’s statutory deadline was January 24) but did not file a motion to sever before that date.
- Roger filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27, 2016 arguing his 6‑month speedy-trial time had run; an evidentiary hearing followed.
- The district court found the codefendant exclusion of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(e) applied, excluded eight days (Jan. 24–Feb. 1) as reasonable delay with good cause for not severing, and denied discharge.
- Roger appealed, arguing the trial court misapplied § 29-1207(4)(e) (waiver/need to move to sever, computation method, reasonableness, and good-cause findings).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Beitel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 29-1207(4)(e) requires a joined codefendant to move to sever to preserve speedy-trial rights | A defendant who fails to request severance effectively waives the right to speedy trial | Beitel: failure to move to sever does not waive the personal speedy-trial right | Court: No. Filing to sever is required only to obtain the remedy of severance before time expires; failure to move does not waive the right to discharge, but forfeits the severance remedy if raised after the deadline |
| Proper method to compute excluded time under § 29-1207(4)(e) when trial is set for a date certain | Use joint scheduling and exclude time tied to the later codefendant | Beitel: court used the longer codefendant calculation instead of measuring from his own deadline | Court: Measure defendant's speedy deadline absent the exclusion, then count days beyond that date to the set joint-trial date (court used this method) |
| Whether the 8-day delay (Jan. 24–Feb. 1) was "reasonable" under § 29-1207(4)(e) | The short delay was reasonable given trial logistics and scheduling constraints | Beitel: earlier January dates were available and delay was not reasonable | Court: Not clearly erroneous to find 8 days reasonable (5-day trial estimate, limited jury pool, clerk’s scheduling showing) |
| Whether there was "good cause" for not granting severance under § 29-1207(4)(e) | Joinder and the court’s scheduling concerns, evidence supporting joint trial, and Roger’s failure to timely seek severance establish good cause | Beitel: court improperly based finding on Roger’s failure to move to sever | Court: Good cause exists as a factual determination; court considered multiple evidentiary factors beyond failure to move and did not clearly err |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (discussing legislative history and adoption of ABA speedy-trial standards)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (discussing federal Speedy Trial Act unitary-clock effect for joined defendants)
- State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (explaining computation method for the six-month speedy-trial period)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (holding the primary burden to bring an accused to trial rests with the State)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (defining "good cause" as a substantial reason in speedy-trial contexts)