State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen's information filed July 1, 2015, Roger's July 15, 2015.
- Allen waived speedy trial and moved his trial date; the court granted joinder of the cases for a joint trial (order entered Nov. 18, 2015).
- At a Jan. 5, 2016 pretrial conference the court set the joint trial for the week beginning Feb. 1, 2016; Roger’s counsel objected that this date exceeded Roger’s speedy‑trial deadline (Jan. 24, 2016).
- Roger did not file a motion to sever before his speedy‑trial date; he filed a motion for absolute discharge on Jan. 27, 2016 claiming his 6‑month statutory time had run.
- The district court denied discharge, finding the § 29‑1207(4)(e) codefendant exclusion applied: (1) cases were joined and Allen’s time had not run, (2) the 8‑day delay (Jan. 24–Jan. 31) was reasonable, and (3) there was good cause not to grant severance. Roger appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Beitel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 29‑1207(4)(e) create a unitary speedy‑trial clock for all joined codefendants? | Implicitly urged a unitary clock measured by the latest codefendant’s time. | § 29‑1207(4)(e) protects each defendant’s personal speedy‑trial right; joinder shouldn’t automatically extend everyone’s clock. | Court: No unitary clock; statute protects personal speedy‑trial rights and does not adopt federal unitary rule. |
| Must a defendant (or codefendant) file a motion to sever before his speedy‑trial time expires to preserve the right? | Argued failure to move to sever constituted waiver of speedy‑trial protection. | Failure to move to sever before expiration does not waive the personal right to speedy trial; it only forfeits the severance remedy after time expires. | Court: No waiver of the speedy‑trial right; failing to seek severance before expiration forecloses later severance relief but does not itself extinguish the right. |
| How is the period of excluded delay under § 29‑1207(4)(e) measured when a joint trial is set? | (State) Use practical scheduling; measure delay relative to the joined trial date. | (Beitel) The shorter (earlier) speedy‑trial calculation should control; court erroneously used longer codefendant calculation. | Court: Compute defendant’s own 6‑month deadline first, then measure the days beyond that date until the joint trial start; court correctly measured an 8‑day exclusion. |
| Did the State prove the statutory factors (joined with codefendant whose time hadn’t run; reasonable delay; good cause for not granting severance) by a preponderance? | State argued evidence supported joinder, reasonableness of 8‑day delay, and good cause (trial length, jury pool concerns, and timing of joinder). | Beitel argued earlier dates were available and court erred in finding delay reasonable and good cause for denying severance. | Court: Affirmed — all three § 29‑1207(4)(e) factors met; 8‑day delay reasonable and sufficient good cause existed not to sever. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (discussing legislative history and ABA Standards adoption) (Neb. 1972) (legislative history of Nebraska speedy‑trial act and ABA Standards)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (discussing federal unitary speedy‑trial clock under federal Speedy Trial Act)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (discussing burden and remedies under Nebraska speedy‑trial statute)
- State v. Betancourt‑Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (discussing computation of statutory speedy‑trial period)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (defining "good cause" in related speedy‑trial/detainer context)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (statutory interpretation principles)