State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781

Background

Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen's information filed July 1, 2015, Roger's July 15, 2015.
Allen waived speedy trial at an October hearing and his trial was continued; the court later granted joinder of Roger’s and Allen’s cases (order entered November 18, 2015).
At a January 5, 2016 pretrial, the court set a joint 5-day jury trial to begin February 1, 2016; Roger’s counsel objected on speedy-trial grounds and was told to file a motion to sever or discharge if desired.
Roger did not move to sever; his statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial deadline (as computed) expired January 24, 2016, so he filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27, 2016.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court excluded the 8 days between January 24 and February 1 under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(e) (codefendant exclusion), found the exclusion applicable, and denied discharge. Roger appealed.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Beitel's Argument	Held
Does § 29-1207(4)(e) create a unitary speedy-trial clock for joined defendants measured by the codefendant with the most time remaining?	§ 29-1207(4)(e) should be read like the federal rule to permit a single clock tied to the latest co‑defendant.	The statute protects each defendant’s personal speedy-trial right; joinder should not automatically extend Roger’s clock.	Court: No unitary clock; Nebraska statute preserves personal speedy‑trial rights and is not read like the federal statute.
Must a defendant (or codefendant) file a motion to sever before his speedy‑trial time expires to preserve the right or to trigger § 29-1207(4)(e)?	Failure to move to sever amounts to waiver of the right to be tried within his original deadline.	Filing a motion to sever is not a prerequisite to preserving the speedy‑trial right; failing to move only forfeits the later remedy of severance.	Court: No absolute requirement to file severance first; not moving forecloses severance relief but does not waive the speedy‑trial right itself.
How is the period of delay measured under § 29-1207(4)(e) when a joint trial is set for a date certain?	(Implicit) Use the later codefendant’s timetable.	Measure delay against the defendant’s own deadline and count days until the joint trial start date.	Court: Measure defendant’s own expiration date, then count days beyond that to joint trial start; here 8 days were excluded.
Did the State prove the § 29-1207(4)(e) elements (joined with a co‑defendant whose time had not run; reasonable delay; good cause for not granting severance)?	Yes: joined before either clock expired; 8‑day delay reasonable given scheduling and jury concerns; good cause existed to avoid severance.	No: earlier January trial dates existed and the court should have severed; no sufficient good cause.	Court: Yes; the State met its burden by a preponderance — the 8‑day delay was reasonable and there was good cause not to sever.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (1972) (discusses adoption and purpose of Nebraska speedy‑trial statute and its relation to ABA Standards)
State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (2016) (explains computation method for the six‑month speedy‑trial period)
State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (2001) (places burden on the State to prove applicable exclusions to speedy‑trial time)
State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (2016) (defines "good cause" as a substantial reason in the speedy‑trial context)
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986) (federal case discussing the unitary speedy‑trial clock under the federal Speedy Trial Act)