State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen’s information filed July 1, 2015, Roger’s July 15, 2015.
- Allen’s trial was initially set for October 5 term (later continued); Roger’s was set for the November jury term but ultimately both were joined for a February 1, 2016 joint trial.
- At an October hearing Allen expressly waived speedy trial; Roger’s counsel later objected at a January pretrial conference that the February trial date exceeded Roger’s January 24 speedy‑trial deadline.
- The court invited motions to sever or for discharge; Roger did not move to sever but filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27 after his speedy‑trial date passed.
- The district court found the § 29‑1207(4)(e) codefendant exclusion applied, excluded eight days (Jan 24–Feb 1) as a reasonable delay with good cause not to sever, and denied discharge; Roger appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Beitel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a joined codefendant must move to sever to preserve speedy‑trial rights | State: failure to move to sever before the deadline effectively waives severance relief and supports applying the codefendant exclusion | Beitel: court erred in construing § 29‑1207(4)(e) to require a motion to sever to preserve speedy‑trial rights | Court: No. § 29‑1207(4)(e) does not impose a filing requirement to preserve the personal speedy‑trial right, though failing to seek severance before the clock runs forecloses severance relief after the deadline |
| Proper method to compute excluded days under § 29‑1207(4)(e) | State: § 29‑1207(4)(e) should be applied so joined defendants share a unitary clock measured by the latest codefendant | Beitel: trial court used the longer codefendant’s calculation rather than his shorter one | Court: Use each defendant’s personal 6‑month computation first; then measure the delay as days beyond that defendant’s expiration to the joint trial date (court used Beitel’s calculation correctly) |
| Whether the brief (8‑day) delay was reasonable | State: modest extension for joint trial is reasonable given logistics | Beitel: earlier January dates existed; delay was unreasonable | Court: Reasonable—trial required a 5‑day setting, January jury availability and peremptory strike concerns made February reasonable |
| Whether there was good cause for not granting severance | State: substantial reasons (trial efficiency, scheduling, prior joinder) justify no severance | Beitel: trial court erred in finding good cause—his failure to file severance shouldn’t be dispositive | Court: Good cause exists as a factual determination; considering joinder timing, scheduling evidence, and Beitel’s failure to timely seek severance, court did not clearly err in finding good cause |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (1972) (discusses legislative history of Nebraska speedy‑trial act and ABA Standards)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986) (federal Speedy Trial Act unitary clock analysis under differing statutory text)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (2001) (places burden on State to prove excluded periods under § 29‑1207(4))
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (2016) (defines “good cause” as a substantial reason in related speedy‑trial context)