State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
Neb.2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; informations filed July 15 (Roger) and July 1 (Allen) 2015.
- Allen’s trial initially set for October 5 term but he waived speedy trial at an October hearing and his trial was continued; Roger’s individual speedy-trial date ran January 24, 2016.
- The State moved to join the cases; the court granted joinder on November 18, 2015, and a joint trial was set to begin February 1, 2016.
- At a January 5, 2016 pretrial conference Roger’s counsel objected that a February trial exceeded Roger’s speedy-trial date; the court told counsel to file motions to sever or for discharge if desired. No severance was filed.
- Roger filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27, 2016; after an evidentiary hearing the district court excluded the 8 days between January 24 and February 1 under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(e) and denied discharge.
- Roger appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding the codefendant exclusion applied and the trial court did not clearly err in finding reasonableness of delay and good cause for not granting severance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Beitel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 29-1207(4)(e) creates a unitary speedy-trial clock for joined defendants | A unitary clock should govern joined defendants, measured by the co-defendant with the most time remaining | Beitel: speedy-trial rights are personal; joinder should not automatically extend his clock | Court: Rejected unitary-clock reading; speedy-trial right is personal under Nebraska law |
| Whether a co-defendant must move for severance before the first defendant’s clock expires | Implied waiver if co-defendant fails to seek severance in time | Beitel: trial court erred in treating failure to move to sever as waiver of speedy-trial right | Court: No requirement that a severance motion be filed to preserve speedy-trial right; failure to move only forecloses later severance remedy |
| Whether the 8-day delay (Jan 24–Feb 1) is a "reasonable period of delay" under § 29-1207(4)(e) | The short, 8-day delay to allow a joint 5-day trial was reasonable given scheduling and jury pool concerns | Beitel: earlier dates in January were available and trial beyond his statutory date was unreasonable | Court: 8-day delay was reasonable based on court scheduling, estimated trial length, and jury pool concerns; no clear error |
| Whether there was "good cause for not granting a severance" under § 29-1207(4)(e) | Joinder and the surrounding facts (timing, evidence supporting joinder, lack of timely severance request) established good cause to deny severance | Beitel: absence of a compelling reason; trial court improperly found good cause | Court: "Good cause" means a substantial reason; the record supported the court’s factual finding of good cause; no clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (statutory-interpretation principles applied)
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (history of Nebraska speedy-trial act and ABA standards)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (federal Speedy Trial Act interpretation regarding co-defendant exclusion)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (State bears burden to justify excluded time)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (definition of "good cause" as a substantial reason)