State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen’s information filed July 1, 2015, Roger’s on July 15, 2015.
- Allen’s trial was continued with an express waiver of speedy trial; Roger’s initial trial date was later and his speedy-trial clock would run on January 24, 2016.
- The State moved to join the cases; the court granted joinder and set a joint trial to begin February 1, 2016 (jury selection).
- At a January 5 pretrial conference Roger’s counsel objected that the February date exceeded Roger’s speedy-trial date but did not file a motion to sever; the court invited pretrial motions but none to sever were filed.
- Roger filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27, 2016 (after his speedy-trial date), alleging the statute’s 6-month period had expired; the trial court denied discharge, applying the § 29-1207(4)(e) codefendant exclusion to exclude 8 days between January 24 and February 1.
- Roger appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding the exclusion applied because the State proved joinder, reasonableness of the short delay, and good cause for not granting severance.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Beitel's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a joined codefendant must file a pre-expiration motion to sever to preserve his individual speedy-trial right | A joined codefendant who fails to move to sever in time effectively waives the ability to obtain a severance to keep his earlier trial date | Failure to move to sever does not waive the personal statutory speedy-trial right | Court: No — filing a pre-expiration severance motion is required only to obtain the separate remedy of severance; not filing does not waive the speedy-trial right itself |
| Whether § 29-1207(4)(e) creates a single unitary speedy-trial clock measured by the latest co-defendant | Urges federal-style unitary clock where exclusions for one codefendant apply to all joined defendants | Nebraska statute’s language and history preserve individual, personal speedy-trial rights | Court: Statute does not create a unitary clock; Nebraska intended a personal right, not automatic unification |
| How to measure excluded delay under § 29-1207(4)(e) when joint trial set for a date certain | State measured delay by reference to joint trial date (effectively using later date) | Beitel argued the shorter individual calculation should control and the court used the wrong baseline | Court: Compute defendant’s own 6-month expiration absent the exclusion, then measure days beyond that until joint trial; here 8-day exclusion was correctly measured |
| Whether the State proved (1) reasonableness of delay and (2) good cause for not granting severance | Short, 8-day delay was reasonable given trial logistics; evidence showed a 5-day trial, jury pool concerns, and lack of available January settings — good cause existed to keep joinder | Argued earlier trial dates were available and no sufficient reason existed to deny severance | Court: State met burden by preponderance; 8-day delay was reasonable and record supported a substantial reason (good cause) not to sever |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (discussing legislative history of Nebraska speedy-trial act and ABA Standards)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (discussing federal speedy trial clock principles under the Speedy Trial Act)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (clarifying burden on State and speedy-trial discharge remedy)
- State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (procedural computation of speedy-trial periods)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (definition and application of "good cause")