State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
Neb.2017Background
- Roger and Allen Beitel were separately charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; informations filed July 15, 2015 (Roger) and July 1, 2015 (Allen).
- Allen’s trial was continued and he expressly waived speedy trial at an October 5, 2015 hearing; Roger’s arraignment set his trial later and his speedy-trial deadline was January 24, 2016.
- The State moved to join the cases and the court granted joinder on November 18, 2015; a joint trial was set to begin February 1, 2016 after a January 5, 2016 pretrial conference.
- At the January pretrial conference Roger’s counsel objected that the February date exceeded Roger’s speedy-trial date but did not file a severance motion; the court told counsel to file motions if they wanted hearings before trial.
- Roger filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27, 2016 (after his speedy-trial date passed); the trial court denied the motion, finding § 29-1207(4)(e) (codefendant exclusion) applied and excluded the 8 days between January 24 and February 1 as reasonable delay with good cause for denying severance.
- Roger appealed, asserting errors in the court’s interpretation and application of the codefendant exclusion; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Beitel's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a joined codefendant must move to sever before his own speedy-trial clock expires to preserve his personal speedy-trial right | A failure to move to sever waived the possibility of severance and should permit exclusion under § 29-1207(4)(e) measured by the later clock | A defendant need not file a severance before his clock expires; § 29-1207(4)(e) protects a personal right and does not require such a motion to preserve the right | Court: No mandatory severance filing requirement; failure to seek severance before expiration waives the remedy of severance but does not waive the right to speedy trial |
| Whether the codefendant exclusion creates a unitary speedy-trial clock measured by the co‑defendant with the most remaining time | Urged construction like the federal Speedy Trial Act producing a unitary clock tied to the latest codefendant | Argued Nebraska statute’s plain language and legislative history create a personal speedy-trial right, not a unitary clock | Court: Rejected unitary-clock construction; Nebraska intended personal rights; different language/legislative history than federal law |
| How to compute the excluded period when a joint trial is set for a date certain after the defendant’s solo deadline | Use the joint/calendared trial date and measure days beyond the defendant’s own speedy-trial expiration | Agreed with precise computation but argued the court improperly used the co‑defendant’s timeline | Court: Compute defendant’s deadline absent exclusion, then count days from that date to the joint trial start; court correctly measured 8 days beyond Roger’s deadline |
| Whether the State proved (1) the delay was reasonable and (2) there was good cause for not granting severance under § 29-1207(4)(e) | Argued trial scheduling (need for five full trial days, limited jury pool, scheduling availability) made an 8‑day extension reasonable and that good cause existed not to sever | Argued earlier dates were available and no substantial reason existed to deny severance | Court: Affirmed that an 8‑day delay was reasonable given scheduling constraints; found ample evidence of substantial "good cause" not to sever; no clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (1972) (discusses legislative history and origins of Nebraska speedy-trial act)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (2001) (places burden on State to prove excluded periods by preponderance)
- State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (2016) (explains computation method for the six-month speedy-trial period)
- State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (2016) (defines "good cause" as a substantial reason in related speedy-trial context)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986) (interprets federal Speedy Trial Act and unitary-clock consequences)
- United States v. Payden, 620 F. Supp. 1426 (1985) (federal district court discussing unitary clock application under federal statute)