State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781

Background

Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen's information filed July 1, 2015; Roger's filed July 15, 2015.
Allen’s trial was originally set for October 5 but was continued after Allen waived speedy trial; Roger’s trial was set for November 2; the court later granted the State’s motion to join the cases for trial (order entered November 18, 2015).
At a January 5, 2016 pretrial conference the joint trial was set for jury selection beginning February 1, 2016; Roger’s counsel objected that February exceeded Roger’s January 24 speedy‑trial deadline but did not file a motion to sever then.
Roger filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27, 2016, claiming his 6‑month speedy trial time had run; an evidentiary hearing followed January 28; the district court excluded 8 days under the codefendant exclusion (§ 29‑1207(4)(e)) and denied discharge on January 29.
The district court found the three § 29‑1207(4)(e) elements met: (1) joined with a codefendant whose time had not run, (2) the 8‑day delay was reasonable, and (3) there was good cause for not granting severance; Roger appealed and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a joined codefendant must file a motion to sever before his clock expires to preserve speedy trial rights	State: failure to move to sever amounted to waiver of quicker trial	Beitel: statute does not require a pre‑expiration severance motion to preserve speedy‑trial right	Court: No. Filing early severance preserves ability to get severance relief, but failing to move does not waive the personal speedy‑trial right (practical effect is loss of severance remedy)
Which defendant's speedy‑trial computation controls when joined	State: adopt unitary clock set by codefendant with most time remaining	Beitel: shorter, individual clock should control; exclusion applies only to reasonable additional days	Court: Rejected unitary‑clock view; speedy trial is a personal right and compute each defendant’s 6‑month period, then exclude any additional reasonable delay under §29‑1207(4)(e)
Whether the 8‑day delay between Beitel’s expiration date and joint trial was reasonable	State: 8 days reasonable given scheduling, trial length, and jury pool limits	Beitel: earlier January dates were available; delay therefore unreasonable	Court: 8‑day delay was reasonable based on court calendar, required 5‑day trial length, and jury pool concerns; no clear error
Whether there was good cause for not granting severance	State: joinder and scheduling needs provided substantial reason not to sever	Beitel: only reason was his failure to move to sever, which is insufficient	Court: Good cause exists when substantial factual reasons justify not severing; court considered joinder evidence, scheduling exhibits, and defendant’s failure to seek severance and did not clearly err in finding good cause

Key Cases Cited

State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (addressing legislative history of Nebraska speedy‑trial act and adoption of ABA standards)
State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (burden on State to bring defendant to trial within statutory time)
State v. Betancourt‑Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (method for computing six‑month speedy‑trial period)
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (federal Speedy Trial Act unitary‑clock discussion)
State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (definition and application of "good cause" in related speedy‑trial context)