State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen was charged July 1, 2015, Roger July 15, 2015.
- Allen’s arraignment set his trial for October 5 (later continued); Roger’s was set for November 2. The cases were later joined; joinder order entered November 18, 2015.
- At a January 5, 2016 pretrial conference the court set a joint trial to begin February 1, 2016, and Roger’s counsel objected that the February date exceeded Roger’s speedy-trial deadline (January 24, 2016).
- Roger did not file a motion to sever before his speedy-trial deadline; he filed a motion for absolute discharge on January 27, 2016 asserting the statutory 6‑month time had run.
- The district court found the codefendant exclusion under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(e) applied, excluded the 8 days between January 24 and February 1 as reasonable delay with good cause for not severing, and denied discharge.
- Roger appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, interpreting § 29-1207(4)(e) and upholding the district court’s factual findings as not clearly erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 29-1207(4)(e) imposes a unitary speedy-trial clock for joined codefendants | State: joined defendants should share the latest codefendant’s clock (unitary rule) | Beitel: statute protects each defendant’s personal speedy-trial right; no unitary clock | Court: No unitary clock; statute and legislative history treat speedy-trial right as personal |
| Whether a defendant must file a motion to sever before his clock expires to preserve speedy-trial rights | State: failure to move to sever effectively waives right to timely trial | Beitel: not required to file severance to preserve right to discharge | Court: Filing a severance before expiration is needed to obtain severance relief, but failure to file does not waive the underlying speedy-trial right to seek discharge later |
| How to measure the excluded period under § 29-1207(4)(e) when joint trial is set for a date certain | State: use latest codefendant’s computation | Beitel: use the shorter (defendant’s own) computation and measure days beyond that to joint trial | Court: Measure each defendant’s own 6‑month clock, then count days beyond that date to the joint-trial start (court used Roger’s clock; measured 8 days) |
| Whether the State proved (by preponderance) the elements of § 29-1207(4)(e): joinder, reasonable delay, and good cause for not granting severance | State: proved joinder, short (8-day) delay, and good cause (trial efficiency, scheduling, five-day estimate, limited jury pool) | Beitel: earlier available dates existed; court erred finding delay reasonable and good cause | Court: Affirmed—joinder existed; 8-day delay reasonable on record; good cause shown given trial logistics and evidence supporting joint trial; no clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (discussing plain-meaning statutory interpretation in criminal context)
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (legislative history and adoption of ABA speedy-trial standards)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (explaining federal unitary speedy-trial clock under the federal Speedy Trial Act)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (placing burden on the State to show applicability of excluded periods)