State v. Beitel
296 Neb. 781
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were separately charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen's information was filed July 1, 2015, Roger's July 15, 2015.
- Allen waived speedy trial at an October hearing and his trial was continued; the court later granted the State’s motion to join Roger and Allen for a joint trial (order entered Nov. 18, 2015).
- At a Jan. 5, 2016 pretrial conference, the court set the joint trial to begin Feb. 1, 2016 (5-day estimate); Roger’s counsel objected on speedy-trial grounds and was told to file a motion to sever or for discharge.
- Roger did not move to sever before his statutory speedy-trial deadline (Jan. 24, 2016); he filed a motion for absolute discharge on Jan. 27, 2016; hearing held Jan. 28.
- The district court found the three statutory elements of the codefendant exclusion (§ 29-1207(4)(e)) were met (joined with a codefendant whose time had not run; an 8-day delay to trial was reasonable; there was good cause for not granting severance) and denied discharge; Roger appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Beitel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 29-1207(4)(e) creates a unitary speedy-trial clock for joined defendants | The codefendant exclusion should allow measuring all joined defendants’ time by the latest codefendant (unitary clock) | Beitel argued the exclusion is a personal right and his clock expired Jan. 24; joint scheduling beyond that date violated his speedy-trial right | Court rejected a unitary-clock construction; statute protects individual rights and does not automatically adopt the latest codefendant’s clock |
| Whether a defendant must move to sever before his deadline to preserve speedy-trial rights | Implied waiver because Beitel did not file a severance request that would have allowed earlier trial | Beitel said he preserved the issue by objecting at the pretrial conference and filing for discharge after his deadline ran | Court held failure to move to sever before deadline forecloses severance remedy but does not waive the speedy-trial right; defendant may instead move for discharge after time expires |
| Whether the delay between Beitel’s deadline and the joint trial start was reasonable | Short delay (8 days) was reasonable given scheduling and a 5-day estimated trial | Beitel argued earlier January dates were available and the delay was not reasonable | Court found the 8-day delay reasonable based on the court’s calendar, trial length, and jury-pool concerns |
| Whether there was "good cause" for not granting severance under § 29-1207(4)(e) | The State relied on consolidation reasons, scheduling, and the absence of an earlier severance request | Beitel contended the absence of good cause and that severance would have allowed trial within his limits | Court applied a substantial-reason test and found, on the record, sufficient good cause not to sever; no clear error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (1972) (discusses adoption and legislative intent of Nebraska speedy-trial statute)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986) (interprets federal Speedy Trial Act and unitary-clock consequences)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (2001) (places burden on State to prove applicable excluded periods)
- State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 295 Neb. 170 (2016) (explains computation method for the six-month speedy-trial period)
- Miller v. State, 706 P.2d 336 (Alaska App. 1985) (ABA commentary-aligned authority on preserving individual speedy-trial rights and limited judge discretion to extend for joint trials)