State v. Begay
2017 NMSC 9
| N.M. | 2017Background
- Trevor Begay pleaded no contest to a petty misdemeanor battery in magistrate court; was sentenced to 182 days, 171 days suspended, with supervised probation and 11 days credit.
- Begay failed to complete probation conditions (life-skills class, community service); magistrate court set a revocation hearing and issued a bench warrant after he did not appear on September 25, 2012.
- Begay’s original probationary term would have expired December 27, 2012, but he remained at large on an outstanding warrant until his arrest on February 11, 2013.
- After arrest Begay admitted violating probation; on March 14, 2013 the magistrate court revoked probation and imposed 171 days, suspending part and awarding confinement credit, leaving 44 days to serve.
- Begay appealed through district court and Court of Appeals; the district court affirmed (de novo review), but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the magistrate court lacked power to toll the probation under the then-existing tolling statute and that Begay’s probation expired December 27, 2012.
- The State petitioned for certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme Court; the Legislature later amended the tolling statute, but the Supreme Court retained review because of broader public-interest implications.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Begay) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a magistrate court had jurisdiction to revoke probation when the probation term expired while defendant was a fugitive on a bench warrant | Section 31-20-8 should not bar revocation where defendant absconded; courts may treat the fugitive period as not running | Section 31-20-8 relieves defendant of obligations when the suspension period expires and Section 31-21-15(C) (as then written) did not authorize magistrate courts to toll the term, so magistrate lost jurisdiction at expiration | Magistrate court had jurisdiction; Section 31-20-8 should not be read to allow defendants to evade obligations by absconding, so time while a defendant is a fugitive does not run against the probation term |
| Whether Section 31-21-15(C) (pre-amendment) authorized courts of limited jurisdiction to toll a probationary term while a defendant was a fugitive | (State) Tolling is consistent with statutory purpose and prevents absurd results | (Begay) The statute applied only to district courts, so magistrate courts could not toll the term | Court agreed Section 31-21-15(C) as written did not empower courts of limited jurisdiction to toll, but this did not end the inquiry because Section 31-20-8 must be construed to avoid an absurd result |
| Proper interpretation of Section 31-20-8 when defendant absconds after alleged violation | Section should be construed to preserve court power to revoke when defendant’s own conduct prevents timely proceedings | Section’s plain text entitles defendant to certificate when suspension expires without revocation, regardless of circumstances | Court departs from a strictly literal reading to avoid absurdity: when defendant absconds and causes inability to proceed, the probation term does not run during the fugitive period |
| Effect of Court of Appeals decision and legislative amendment | (State) Court of Appeals’ narrow reading would invalidate many magistrate orders and encourage absconding; legislative amendment clarified tolling but does not moot public interest | (Begay) Amendment renders further review unnecessary and favors defendant | Supreme Court retained review, reversed Court of Appeals, and remanded for execution of the magistrate court’s revocation and sentence; recognized Legislature later amended statute but resolved statutory interpretation to avoid absurd results |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cannon, 457 So.2d 1177 (La. 1984) (holding probationary period ceases to run while defendant is a fugitive; impediment must derive from defendant's concealment or flight)