State v. Bazaldua
A-16-422
Neb. Ct. App.Feb 7, 2017Background
- Defendant Eliasib R. Bazaldua (age 54) was charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child (count 1) and third-degree sexual assault of a child (count 2) after the victim U.M., born June 2009, reported multiple sexual incidents.
- Bazaldua pled no contest to count 2 (third-degree) with no plea agreement; the jury tried only count 1 (first-degree) and convicted him after trial; he did not testify.
- Victim U.M., then age 6 at trial, described three incidents: (1) fellatio in a kitchen/counter incident, (2) anal penetration in a bedroom, and (3) penile contact/penetration at another location; a forensic interview and medical exam (normal) were admitted.
- Police recorded a three-hour interview in which Bazaldua admitted showing U.M. how to masturbate (kitchen incident) but denied penetration or other incidents; that recorded statement was admitted over objections after a motion in limine partially limiting opening statement references.
- The jury found Bazaldua guilty of first-degree sexual assault of a child; the court sentenced him to 30–60 years (count 1) and 4–5 years (count 2), concurrent; Bazaldua appealed raising sufficiency of evidence, excessiveness of sentence, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Bazaldua) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for first-degree sexual assault (sexual penetration of <12-year-old) | Victim testimony and other evidence support conviction; any one incident meets statutory "sexual penetration" definition | U.M. was the only substantive evidence, was not credible, and may have been suggested/coached; timing alleged was not proved | Affirmed: viewing evidence in State's favor, a rational juror could find penetration beyond a reasonable doubt; timing is not an element of the offense (conviction stands) |
| Excessive sentence (30–60 yrs on count 1) | Sentence within statutory limits; court considered statutory factors and public protection needs | Argues court should have imposed minimum given low assessed recidivism risk and possible deportation makes long imprisonment unnecessary | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; sentence not excessive or unreasonable |
| Ineffective assistance — pressured plea to count 2 | State notes plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered on record | Bazaldua claims trial counsel pressured him into a no-contest plea (off‑record discussion) | Not resolved on direct appeal: record insufficient; claim may implicate privileged communications and requires evidentiary hearing |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to renew objections about evidence from count 2 | State: counsel properly preserved objections and renewed them before the tape was played; victim testimony about other incidents was admissible and outside motion in limine | Bazaldua contends counsel failed to timely renew objections to testimony about the kitchen incident after he pled no contest to count 2 | Rejected on record: counsel renewed objections before the recorded interview; motion in limine did not cover victim testimony, so failure to renew earlier would have lacked merit |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Jones, 293 Neb. 452, 878 N.W.2d 379 (appellate standard for sufficiency review)
- State v. Samayoa, 292 Neb. 334, 873 N.W.2d 449 (time/date is not an element in child sexual assault statutes)
- State v. Dixon, 286 Neb. 334, 837 N.W.2d 496 (sentencing: factors and abuse-of-discretion standard)
- State v. Nevels, 235 Neb. 39, 453 N.W.2d 579 (minimum portion of indeterminate sentence measures severity)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- State v. Newman, 290 Neb. 572, 861 N.W.2d 123 (on direct appeal, ineffective-assistance claims must be raised if apparent from record; record sufficiency governs review)
- State v. Rodriguez, 244 Neb. 707, 509 N.W.2d 1 (coaching relates to witness credibility and is for the jury)
