State v. Battigaglia, 2021 Ohio 1781

In June 2013 Battigaglia pleaded guilty to one count of domestic violence (first‑degree misdemeanor). The court imposed 90 days jail (87 suspended), 12 months probation (community control), a $250 fine, $70 costs, mandatory anger management, and no contact with the victim.
In January 2014 the probation department filed a notice alleging multiple probation violations (failure to report, pay fines/costs/fees, respond to notices, and attend anger management). Battigaglia failed to appear for the March 2014 hearing and the court issued a capias.
Battigaglia was later sentenced to nine years in prison for a separate 2014 felony. While incarcerated he filed (pro se) a June 2020 “Motion to Run Probation Violation Concurrent and/or Vacate Probation,” seeking removal of the outstanding warrant and a clean slate to obtain transitional control, judicial release, and programming.
The municipal court denied the motion without opinion. On appeal Battigaglia argued the denial was an abuse of discretion and sought vacatur of probation/capias and/or concurrent running of the probation violation.
The appellate majority construed the motion as a petition for postconviction relief, held it was untimely under R.C. 2953.21, found the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Battigaglia did not meet R.C. 2953.23(A) exceptions, and affirmed. A dissent argued the trial court retained jurisdiction over community control violations and would have remanded for reasons for denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Battigaglia)	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Battigaglia’s motion to vacate probation/run the probation violation concurrent (effectively asking to quash capias).	The motion is a postconviction petition filed well beyond the 365‑day limit; it is untimely and the court lacks jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.23 because Battigaglia did not satisfy the statutory exceptions or the "but‑for" showing.	The outstanding capias prevents transitional control, judicial release, education/programming and employment; he asked the court to vacate probation or run the violation concurrent to remove those barriers.	Affirmed. Appellate court construed the filing as a postconviction petition, found it untimely and that Battigaglia failed to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A) exceptions; thus the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief.
Whether the trial court could (or should) waive court costs despite no express motion below.	Not directly argued below; the State noted Battigaglia did not seek cost waiver in the motion.	Battigaglia later argued on appeal the court may waive costs under R.C. 2947.23(C) even years after conviction.	Court observed that while the trial court may have discretion to waive costs, Battigaglia did not request such relief in the trial court, so the appellate court did not grant it. Dissent noted the trial court could consider a costs‑waiver motion if filed.

State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997) (vaguely titled motion may be construed as postconviction petition when it is a collateral attack seeking to render judgment void)
State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 860 N.E.2d 77 (2006) (postconviction relief is a collateral civil attack; standards for relief and review described)
State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 121 N.E.3d 351 (2018) (timeliness and jurisdictional review of postconviction petitions explained)
State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967) (postconviction relief principles)
State v. Amos, 140 Ohio St.3d 238, 17 N.E.3d 528 (2014) (policy favoring community‑control sanctions and sentencing goals)
Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 676 N.E.2d 171 (1996) (pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards though courts may afford some leniency)
State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990) (community‑control conditions cannot be overly broad and must reasonably relate to rehabilitation and public protection)