State v. Bates (Slip Opinion)
2020 Ohio 634
Ohio2020Background
- Two-year-old Glenara Bates died after extensive chronic and acute injuries; autopsy found intracranial hemorrhages and signs of long-term malnutrition and repeated blunt-force trauma. Defendant Glen E. Bates confessed in police interviews to biting the child and swinging her by the legs but alternately denied causing the fatal head injury.
- A Hamilton County grand jury indicted Bates for aggravated murder (with a capital specification), child endangering, and felony murder. A jury convicted him on all counts and recommended death; the trial court imposed the death sentence.
- During jury selection, prospective jurors completed written questionnaires. Juror No. 31 (a white woman) wrote that she sometimes does not feel comfortable around "black people" and that "Blacks" are more violent than other groups.
- Juror No. 31 was not individually questioned about those answers, was not challenged for cause, and defense counsel declined to use the remaining peremptory challenge to strike her; she served on the jury.
- The Ohio Supreme Court held defense counsel’s failure to inquire or strike juror No. 31 was objectively unreasonable under Strickland and that juror No. 31’s questionnaire responses showed actual racial bias sufficient to establish prejudice; it reversed convictions and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to question/strike juror No. 31 | Bates: counsel was objectively unreasonable for not probing juror No. 31's explicit racial statements and for not using a peremptory to remove her | State: counsel had wide latitude in voir dire; mere questionnaire responses did not prove actual bias or prejudice | Held for Bates: counsel deficient; juror No. 31’s statements showed actual racial bias and prejudiced Bates, requiring reversal and new trial |
| Standard for proving "actual bias" from racially generalized juror statements | Bates: expressions that a racial group is more violent can itself show inability to be impartial toward a defendant of that race | State/Dissent: "actual bias" requires more—bias against the defendant personally or further evidence; general statements are insufficient without rehabilitation | Held: Court overruled Pickens to the extent that actual bias may be shown by general, group-based statements that indicate inability to be impartial in the case |
| Whether prejudice is presumed when counsel allows an apparently biased juror to sit | Bates: prejudice shown because an actually biased juror participated | Dissent: Strickland prejudice should not be presumed absent showing the juror was actually biased in the defendant’s case; condemns collapsing Strickland inquiry | Held: Majority found prejudice because juror No. 31’s expressed racial stereotype demonstrated actual bias; reversal required (concurrences/dissent disagree on scope) |
| Whether other seated jurors (e.g., Juror No. 10) created additional ineffective-assistance or impartial-jury claims | Bates: some concurring justices argued counsel also erred by not questioning juror No. 10, who expressed doubt she could be fair | State: silence to general questions does not prove inability to be impartial | Held: Majority did not base decision on Juror No. 10; one concurrence would also find ineffective assistance as to No. 10 |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance standard)
- Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (U.S. 1982) (defendant entitled to jury that will decide solely on the evidence)
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (U.S. 1984) (impartial trier of fact is foundational to fair trial)
- Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (U.S. 1986) (race in capital sentencing can create unique risk of prejudice)
- Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (U.S. 2017) (racial stereotypes can infect sentencing/jury deliberations)
- State v. Pickens, 25 N.E.3d 1023 (Ohio 2014) (prior Ohio decision on counsel’s duty to follow up on racially biased questionnaire answers; partially overruled)
- State v. Mundt, 873 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 2007) (adopted actual-bias standard for Strickland prejudice claims involving juror bias)
- Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (counsel’s failure to respond to an express juror admission of bias is objectively unreasonable)
- Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (U.S. 1988) (a preserved objection to a biased juror mandates reversal)