State v. Barrows
424 P.3d 612
Mont.2018Background
- Defendant Barrows was tried on multiple counts; midtrial the court dismissed (acquitted) the Lorazepam possession count for insufficiency of the State's evidence.
- After the defense presented testimony and rested, the prosecutor asked the judge to reconsider; the judge reversed the midtrial dismissal and submitted the Lorazepam count to the jury.
- The jury convicted Barrows on all counts, and he received a sentence that included the Lorazepam conviction.
- Barrows appealed, arguing the judge’s midtrial reversal violated the Double Jeopardy Clause; he also challenged the court’s refusal to permit him to represent himself and certain discrepancies in the written judgment (surcharges and conditions).
- The Montana Supreme Court reviewed whether Montana law (§ 46-16-403, MCA) or pre-existing authority permitted midtrial reconsideration of a judge-directed acquittal and examined Faretta waiver standards and conformity between oral and written judgments.
Issues
| Issue | Barrows' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether midtrial judicial dismissal for insufficiency may be reopened without violating Double Jeopardy | The statute and Smith v. authority bar reconsideration once a count is dismissed midtrial; Barrows relied on dismissal and testified, so reversal prejudiced him | §46-16-403 allows reopening until the entire action/case is dismissed; a single-count midtrial dismissal is nonfinal until the whole proceeding ends | The court held the midtrial dismissal was an acquittal and final; reopening after dismissal violated Double Jeopardy — the Lorazepam conviction must be vacated and the count dismissed |
| Whether the court erred by refusing Barrows' request to represent himself (Faretta right) | Barrows sought self-representation; he argues the court should have permitted a Faretta waiver | The court found Barrows equivocated, acted disruptively, and primarily sought to avoid appointed counsel; thus he did not clearly invoke Faretta | Court affirmed: Barrows did not make an unequivocal, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of counsel; retaining appointed counsel was proper |
| Whether the written judgment conforms to the oral pronouncement and statutory surcharges | Barrows (and parties) contend written judgment includes extraneous parole conditions and incorrect surcharge amounts | State had imposed surcharges inconsistent with oral pronouncement and statutory limits | Court ordered correction: strike specified parole conditions, reduce IT surcharge to $10, and prosecutor surcharge to $100 to conform with oral sentence and Montana law |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005) (face‑upheld rule: a facially unqualified midtrial acquittal for insufficiency is final unless preexisting authority plainly allows reconsideration)
- Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013) (dismissal for insufficiency of evidence is an acquittal even if erroneous)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has right to self‑representation upon an unequivocal, knowing, and voluntary waiver of counsel)
- State v. Langford, 267 Mont. 95 (1994) (Montana standards for Faretta waiver: unequivocal, voluntary, knowing, intelligent)
- State v. Gregori, 375 Mont. 367 (2014) (applied §46‑16‑403 to permit review that recognized single‑count midtrial dismissals under Montana law)
- State v. Hegg, 288 Mont. 254 (1998) (same)
Conclusion
The Montana Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part: it vacated Barrows's Lorazepam conviction and sentence (Double Jeopardy violation), affirmed the denial of self‑representation, and remanded to correct the written judgment to match the oral pronouncement and statutory surcharges.