State v. Barr, 463 P.3d 1286

Detectives found hundreds of child‑pornography images/videos on Barr’s devices; he was charged with five counts of sexual exploitation of a child and the State filed an Information Part II alleging he was a repeat sex offender under I.C. § 19‑2520G.
Section 19‑2520G(3) provides a mandatory minimum 15‑year sentence for repeat violations of certain sex offenses; the statute was understood to require 15 years per count.
Parties initially proposed a plea (unified 50 years, 20 fixed) but the district court questioned whether § 19‑2520G required consecutive fixed minima; the plea was rejected.
On day two of trial Barr pleaded guilty to five counts plus the repeat‑offender enhancement; the court repeatedly stated it believed it had no discretion and that the 15‑year sentences would be fixed and consecutive for an aggregate 75‑year determinate term.
Defense did not object to the court’s conclusion of no discretion, declined additional evaluations, and the court imposed five consecutive 15‑year fixed sentences (75 years).
On appeal Barr argued the court abused its discretion by not recognizing (a) authority to impose indeterminate/determinate portions and (b) authority to run sentences concurrently; he also argued § 19‑2520G is unconstitutional if it removes traditional judicial sentencing powers. The Supreme Court affirmed because Barr failed to preserve these arguments below.

Issue	State's Argument	Barr's Argument	Held
Whether the district court had discretion to set indeterminate/determinate portions of each mandatory 15‑year sentence	§ 19‑2520G mandates 15‑year fixed minima; court properly treated sentence as non‑discretionary	Court retained traditional sentencing discretion to craft indeterminate/determinate splits despite the statute	Not reached on the merits — claim is unpreserved; Barr failed to assert a position below and cannot raise it on appeal
Whether the court could run the mandatory 15‑year sentences concurrently rather than consecutively	Statute requires consecutive service; State treated consecutive fixed terms as mandatory	Barr argued court could exercise judicial discretion to run sentences concurrently	Not reached on the merits — unpreserved; Barr never moved or objected below, so appeal is precluded
Whether § 19‑2520G(3) is unconstitutional (separation of powers)	State: constitutional challenge waived because not raised below	Barr: statute unlawfully usurps judicial sentencing authority and is unconstitutional if it removes discretion to impose consecutive/concurrent sentences	Not considered — constitutional argument waived for failure to raise in district court; exception inapplicable because issue and position were not presented below

State v. McIntosh, 368 P.3d 621 (Idaho 2016) (sentencing reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. Le Veque, 426 P.3d 461 (Idaho 2018) (four‑part test for abuse of discretion review)
State v. Villavicencio, 362 P.3d 1 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015) (remand where trial court failed to recognize scope of its sentencing discretion)
State v. Hall, 419 P.3d 1042 (Idaho 2018) (invited error doctrine in criminal appeals)
State v. Blake, 985 P.2d 117 (Idaho 1999) (invited error doctrine prevents a party from prompting action then appealing it)
State v. Gonzalez, 439 P.3d 1267 (Idaho 2019) (preservation requires raising both issue and party’s position below)
Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 787 P.2d 1159 (Idaho 1990) (exception to waiver when trial court actually considered and ruled on the issue)
Roell v. Boise City, 999 P.2d 251 (Idaho 2000) (constitutional claims ordinarily waived if not raised below)