State v. Barnett, 369 N.C. 298

Background

Defendant James Barnett was convicted of attempted second-degree rape and related offenses following an incident where he assaulted the victim in her home and later sent threatening letters and messages to her and her children.
At sentencing the trial court entered a Convicted Sex Offender Permanent No Contact Order (N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50) prohibiting contact with the victim and listed the victim’s three minor children under the order’s “Restrictions.”
The Court of Appeals vacated the no contact order as to the children, holding the statute authorizes protection only for the victim, not third parties.
The State appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which granted discretionary review to decide whether the trial court may include non-victims by name in a § 15A-1340.50 order and under what circumstances.
The Supreme Court held the statute’s protections are for the victim alone, but a trial court may prohibit indirect contact with the victim through third parties (e.g., family or friends) if it makes appropriate findings that such contact would constitute indirect engagement in the prohibited conduct.
The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for the trial court to enter a new permanent no contact order with adequate findings supporting any restrictions on indirect contact through specified third parties.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Barnett's Argument	Held
Whether § 15A-1340.50 authorizes listing non-victims (the victim’s children) in a permanent no contact order	The children were listed to protect the victim by preventing indirect contact through them; court may list third parties if necessary to protect the victim	The order directly protects the children as if they were victims, which the statute does not authorize	Statute protects only the victim, but the court may prohibit indirect contact through specific third parties when supported by appropriate findings; remand for new order with findings
Whether the (f)(7) "catch‑all" extends protections to third parties generally	(Implicit) (f)(7) can be used to craft necessary relief to protect the victim, including listing persons insofar as they relate to protecting the victim	(f)(7) cannot be read to protect non‑victims directly; listing third parties transforms them into protected victims	(f)(7) cannot be read to expand protection to third‑party victims, but it permits tailored restrictions on indirect contact affecting the victim when justified by findings
Required factual support to forbid indirect contact through third parties	Trial court must make findings tying listed third parties to indirect contact harming the victim	Order as written improperly extended full protections to children without such findings	Court must enter written findings explaining how contact with specified third parties would constitute indirect engagement in prohibited conduct under (f)(1)–(6) or (f)(7)
Remedy for deficient findings in original order	State sought reinterpretation to salvage listing as protective of victim	Barnett sought vacatur of restrictions as beyond statutory authority	Supreme Court reversed Court of Appeals in part and remanded to trial court to enter a new order with appropriate findings; other appellate rulings left intact

Key Cases Cited

State v. Mumford, 364 N.C. 394 (review standard for Court of Appeals decisions)
State v. Byrd, 363 N.C. 214 (statutory interpretation when ambiguous)
State v. Davis, 364 N.C. 297 (give plain meaning when statute unambiguous)
State v. Joyner, 329 N.C. 211 (legislative intent controls statutory interpretation)
State v. Elder, 368 N.C. 70 (limits on catch‑all provisions in protection orders)
State v. Hunt, 221 N.C. App. 48 (purpose of § 15A‑1340.50 is to protect sex‑offense victims)