State v. Barnett
368 N.C. 710
| N.C. | 2016Background
- Defendant Keith Barnett was a registered sex offender (1997 conviction) who initially registered with Gaston County on Feb 15, 2010, listing a Gastonia address.
- He was convicted in 2010 (failing to register) and again in Aug 2011; the 2011 conviction was later vacated by the Court of Appeals for a defective indictment and Barnett was released Nov 14, 2012.
- Deputies learned Barnett had not updated his registration after release; on Feb 6, 2013 they went to a suspected address, found Barnett, and arrested him after he resisted; he was indicted Feb 18, 2013 for failing to notify a change of address (N.C.G.S. § 14‑208.11) and for resisting.
- At trial the State proceeded on the theory Barnett failed to notify within three business days of release from incarceration (drawing on § 14‑208.7(a) timing), while the indictment alleged failure to notify within three business days of a change of address under § 14‑208.9.
- The Court of Appeals vacated the registration conviction for a fatal variance/insufficiency of the evidence; the Supreme Court reversed, holding the statutes operate together and the evidence supported the charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Barnett) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was a fatal variance between the indictment (§ 14‑208.9 notice-after-change rule) and the proof (timing tied to release under § 14‑208.7) | Indictment and evidence describe the same statutory duty to notify after an address change; once initially registered, a release-caused address change triggers § 14‑208.9's three-business-day notice duty | The State tried the case under § 14‑208.7 (initial-registration timing), so proof did not match the indictment under § 14‑208.9 — fatal variance | No fatal variance; conviction supported (Court reversed Court of Appeals) |
| Whether § 14‑208.7(a) timing applies only to initial registration, and subsequent releases/changes are governed by § 14‑208.9 | Statutes should be read together: § 14‑208.7(a) governs initial registration; § 14‑208.9 governs later changes of address, including after release | Argues trial focused on release timing under § 14‑208.7, not the § 14‑208.9 theory charged | Court held § 14‑208.7(a) is for initial registration; § 14‑208.9 governs subsequent address changes, so charging under § 14‑208.9 was proper |
| Whether the evidence was sufficient to show Barnett changed his address on release and remained a NC resident | Evidence showed initial registration in Gaston County, release from custody, and failure to re‑register in Gaston County within three days; no evidence he moved out of state | Record lacked direct proof of the exact institutional address before release and lacked explicit proof he remained in-state | Evidence was sufficient when viewed in State’s favor; jury could infer his address changed on release and he remained in NC, supporting conviction |
| Whether ineffective-assistance claim required relief if variance not preserved at trial | N/A (alternative to variance claim) | Trial counsel’s alleged failure to raise variance would be ineffective assistance | Moot—Court resolved variance claim on the merits and rejected it |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Barnett, 223 N.C. App. 65, 733 S.E.2d 95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (Court of Appeals opinion vacating prior 2011 conviction on indictment defect)
- State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 296 S.E.2d 649 (N.C. 1982) (standard for reviewing motions to dismiss—legal sufficiency, de novo)
- State v. Blake, 319 N.C. 599, 356 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. 1987) (elements of motion to dismiss; consider evidence in State’s favor)
- State v. Jackson, 218 N.C. 373, 11 S.E.2d 149 (N.C. 1940) (defendant must be convicted of the offense charged)
- State v. Waddell, 279 N.C. 442, 183 S.E.2d 644 (N.C. 1971) (variance between charge and proof is failure to establish the charged offense)
- State v. Pickens, 346 N.C. 628, 488 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. 1997) (defendant must show fatal variance as to gist of offense)
- State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 2009) (sex-offender registration address treated as residence/place of abode)
- State v. Williams, 318 N.C. 624, 350 S.E.2d 353 (N.C. 1986) (trial court’s failure to submit the charged offense to the jury may amount to dismissal)