State v. BARKMEYER
32 A.3d 950
R.I.2011Background
- Barkmeyer convicted of first-degree child molestation for molesting his eight-year-old stepdaughter; sentenced to 50 years at ACI with 30 to serve, 20 suspended, plus sex-offender registration and treatment programme.
- Defendant timely sought Rule 35(a) sentence reduction; hearing held Aug. 21, 2009 before trial judge.
- Evidence showed he was twice rejected from the Sex Offender Treatment Program for not taking responsibility for the crime; admission of guilt is a prerequisite for program entry.
- Defendant testified to rehabilitation efforts in prison (law library, research, and work) but stated he would not admit guilt due to ongoing postconviction relief and Fifth Amendment concerns.
- Trial judge acknowledged rehabilitation efforts but denied reduction, emphasizing the horror of the offense and absence of “substantial change in circumstances.”
- Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews de novo the Rule 35 decision but defers to trial court’s sentencing discretion; court affirms the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether rehabilitative efforts were properly considered or deemed irrelevant | State argues rehabilitative work is not required to reduce sentence; relevance limited. | Barkmeyer contends rehabilitative efforts show change in circumstances and merit leniency. | No error; rehabilitation efforts not substantial enough to warrant reduction. |
| Whether penalizing or faulting for Fifth Amendment non-admission violated rights | State argues admission could affect program eligibility; failure to admit not punished. | Defendant asserts pressuring to admit guilt infringes Fifth Amendment rights. | Trial court treated non-admission as a neutral fact; no due process violation; no penalty for asserting rights. |
| Standards of review for Rule 35 motions | State maintains deference to trial court’s discretion. | Barkmeyer contends exceptional case requiring alteration of deference. | Appeal denied; decision within discretion; not unjustified given crime severity. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Chase, 9 A.3d 1248 (R.I.2010) (strong policy against intruding on sentencing discretion; limited review)
- State v. Rossi, 771 A.2d 906 (R.I.2001) (extremely limited review of Rule 35 decisions)
- State v. Sifuentes, 667 A.2d 791 (R.I.1995) (limited grounds for disturbing sentencing decisions)
- State v. Ruffner, 5 A.3d 864 (R.I.2010) (prison behavior generally not credited in Rule 35; focus on severity of crime)
- State v. Guzman, 794 A.2d 474 (R.I.2002) (appropriate prison behavior is expected and generally irrelevant to initial sentence)
- State v. Dyer, 14 A.3d 227 (R.I.2011) (rare exception to policy against interference with sentencing; strict standard for reversal)
- State v. Giorgi, 121 R.I. 280, 397 A.2d 898 (1979) (prior guidance on Article III discretion in sentencing)
- State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016 (R.I.2002) (factors considered in imposing sentence include rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment)
- State v. Mendoza, 958 A.2d 1159 (R.I.2008) (Rule 35 motions may be granted for unduly severe sentences)
- State v. Tiernan, 645 A.2d 482 (R.I.1994) (due process limits on penalties for exercising constitutional rights)
