2016 Ohio 7059
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Tyshawn Barker (15) was taken to police around midnight and, after being read Miranda rights, confessed to participation in two murders; a second interview the next day identified a photo of a co-defendant.
- Juvenile court ordered bindover to adult common pleas; Barker moved to suppress his statements claiming he did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waive Miranda rights and that his statements were involuntary.
- Trial court denied suppression; Barker pled no contest to aggravated murder and related charges and was sentenced.
- On first appeal, the appellate court affirmed, relying in part on R.C. 2933.81(B)’s presumption that electronically recorded statements in aggravated-murder cases are voluntary.
- Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the statutory presumption unconstitutional as applied to juveniles and directing review of waiver and voluntariness without the presumption and with the burden on the State.
- On remand, the appellate court reviewed the totality of circumstances (age, intelligence, time, absence of parent, interrogation conduct) and affirmed denial of suppression: Barker knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived Miranda and his statements were voluntary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barker knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived Miranda rights | State: Miranda warnings were read; Barker indicated understanding, signed the form, and participated, so waiver valid | Barker: age (15), borderline intelligence, 3rd-grade reading level, confusion about "attorney," and no parent present meant no valid waiver | Court: Waiver valid under totality; Barker understood warnings, engaged coherently, and voluntarily relinquished rights |
| Whether Barker's statements were voluntary (due-process voluntariness) | State: No coercive police conduct; short interrogation, no threats, allowed breaks, detectives did not deprive or mistreat him | Barker: late-night interrogation, absence of parent, limited intelligence, and potential confusion rendered confession involuntary | Court: No police coercion found; totality shows statements were voluntary |
| Whether the absence of a parent/guardian invalidates juvenile waiver | State: Presence not required; totality can account for parental access | Barker: Lack of parent counseling undermined knowing/informed waiver | Court: Absence noted but did not render waiver invalid under totality; better practice but not constitutionally required here |
| Effect of R.C. 2933.81(B) presumption on juvenile confessions | State (in prior appeal): Statutory presumption supports voluntariness of recorded statements | Barker: Statute cannot relieve State of proving voluntariness for juveniles | Court (on remand): Ohio Supreme Court held statute unconstitutional as applied; remand required reanalysis without the presumption; on remand State met its burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishes warnings and waiver standard)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (waiver can be inferred from actions inconsistent with rights)
- Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (totality test for juvenile waiver includes age, experience, intelligence)
- J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011) (child’s age is relevant to custody analysis)
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile admissions require special care to assure voluntariness)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (due-process voluntariness requires state coercion)
- Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (voluntariness depends on weighing pressure against resistance)
- State v. Osie, 140 Ohio St.3d 131 (2014) (police coercion is prerequisite to finding involuntariness)