State v. Barela, 2015 Utah LEXIS 58

Background

Defendant Robert Barela, a massage therapist, was convicted of first-degree rape after sex with client K.M. at his workplace; semen matching Barela’s DNA was found in K.M.'s vagina.
Two conflicting accounts: Barela said K.M. initiated and consented; K.M. said Barela unexpectedly moved, penetrated her, and she froze.
Jury instructions listed elements including an ‘‘intentionally or knowingly’’ mens rea element but phrased it so mens rea appeared to attach only to the act of intercourse, not to the victim’s nonconsent.
Trial counsel did not object to that instruction and pursued a ‘‘he‑said, she‑said’’ defense rather than a mistake‑of‑fact (reasonable mistake as to consent) theory.
Post‑verdict, new counsel sought a subpoena for K.M.’s medical records under Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b); the trial court denied the request as not reasonably certain to produce exculpatory evidence and for timeliness concerns.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found counsel ineffective for failing to object to the defective mens rea instruction, reversed the conviction, and remanded; it also clarified the scope of Utah Code § 76‑5‑406 and standards for Rule 14(b) subpoenas.

Issues

Issue	Barela's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to mens rea instruction	Instruction misstated law by not requiring mens rea as to victim nonconsent; counsel’s failure prejudiced outcome	Instruction error was harmless because jury likely found Barela knew or was reckless as to nonconsent	Reversed: counsel was ineffective for failing to object; error was reasonably likely to affect verdict (prejudice shown)
Whether counsel was ineffective for not presenting a mistake‑of‑fact defense	Counsel should have advanced reasonable‑mistake defense (lack of mens rea regarding nonconsent)	Strategically reasonable to pursue single factual innocence theory; mistake defense risked undermining primary theory	Not ineffective for declining to present mistake‑of‑fact theory (strategy reasonable)
Whether Utah Code § 76‑5‑406 is an exclusive, exhaustive definition of nonconsent	§ 76‑5‑406 lists all circumstances amounting to nonconsent; conviction insufficient if evidence falls outside list	§ 76‑5‑406 lists situations where nonconsent is conclusively established as a matter of law but is not exhaustive	Court held § 76‑5‑406 is not exhaustive; it prescribes circumstances that preclude a jury finding of consent but does not define the outer bounds of nonconsent
Standard for post‑trial subpoena of medical records under Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b)	Request timely and reasonably likely to produce exculpatory evidence (records could show medication/impairment)	Trial court properly exercised discretion; request untimely and not reasonably certain to yield exculpatory evidence	Court clarified standards: Rule 14(b) allows limited post‑trial requests but defendant must show entitlement under law and "reasonable certainty" that records contain exculpatory evidence; identify records with particularity and limit subject matter; did not decide whether denial here was erroneous

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong ineffective assistance of counsel test)
State v. Marchet, 219 P.3d 75 (Utah Ct. App.) (mens rea must apply to nonconsent element)
State v. Jeffs, 243 P.3d 1250 (Utah 2010) (jury instructions must correctly state application of § 76‑5‑406)
State v. Hutchings, 285 P.3d 1183 (Utah 2012) (instructional error/Strickland prejudice analysis)
State v. Powell, 154 P.3d 788 (Utah 2007) (instructional error evaluated for likelihood of affecting verdict)
State v. Casey, 82 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2003) (same)
State v. Worthen, 222 P.3d 1144 (Utah 2009) (Rule 14(b): defendant must show medical records are reasonably certain to contain exculpatory evidence)
State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987) (rape mens rea can be intentional, knowing, or reckless)