State v. Bao Dinh Dang, 178 Wash. 2d 868

Insanity acquittee Bao Dinh Dang was conditionally released after acquittal by reason of insanity under RCW chapter 10.77.
The State later sought revocation of Dang’s conditional release due to concerns of deterioration and danger, leading to a revocation hearing.
The trial court found Dang dangerous and revoked conditional release; it also admitted hearsay evidence without a good-cause finding, which the court later found harmless.
Court of Appeals affirmed revocation, holding no explicit dangerousness finding was required and that preponderance of the evidence sufficed; it also addressed hearsay limitations.
The Supreme Court granted review to decide (a) whether a dangerousness finding is required for revocation, (b) the proper standard of proof, and (c) limits on hearsay in revocation hearings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is a dangerousness finding required to revoke conditional release for insanity acquittees?	Dang argues no explicit dangerousness finding is needed.	State contends a nondangerous release can be revoked for nonadherence.	Dangerousness finding required; court must find dangerous before revoking.
What standard of proof governs revocation of conditional release?	Dang seeks clear, cogent, and convincing standard.	State supports preponderance of the evidence.	Preponderance of the evidence standard applies.
Was the admission of hearsay at the revocation hearing proper without good cause?	Hearsay should be limited without good cause.	Hearsay admissible under relaxed revocation rules.	Trial court eror in admitting hearsay without good cause; harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
How should RCW 10.77.190(4) be interpreted concerning dangerousness and revocation?	Court should interpret statute to permit revocation for nonadherence.	Statute allows revocation only when public safety threat is shown.	Statute requires a dangerousness finding for revocation; reading must align with constitutional requirement.

O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1975) (mental illness and dangerousness required for involuntary confinement)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (U.S. 1992) (dangerousness required for continued insanity confinement)
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (U.S. 1983) (released when not dangerous; insanity defense relevance)
Klein, 156 Wn.2d 102 (2005) (insanity acquittee must be dangerous to be confined)
Reid, 144 Wn.2d 621 (2001) (insanity acquittee may be committed if mentally ill and dangerous)
LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196 (1986) (mental illness alone not enough for confinement)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (U.S. 1979) (civil commitment requires more than preponderance due to risk of error)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (limited due process rights in revocation hearings)
Dahl, 139 Wn.2d 678 (1999) (require good cause for admitting certain evidence in revocation)
Abd-Rahmaan, 154 Wn.2d 280 (2005) (limits on confrontation in revocation contexts)
Thompson, 28 Wn. App. 728 (1981) (relevance of annual reports in revocation)