168 Conn. App. 194
Conn. App. Ct.2016Background
- On January 8, 2011, Guillermo Balbuena and five others arrived together at a Three Kings Day celebration, vandalized a car belonging to the victim’s brother, and then confronted the victim outside the home.
- The group, armed with two guns and three knives, taunted the victim, chased him, and fired multiple shots; one shot struck the victim in the neck/jaw.
- A witness observed and identified Balbuena and his two brothers and saw Balbuena shoot at the victim; the victim gave statements identifying Balbuena as among the pursuers and at times as the other person with a gun.
- Balbuena was charged with attempt to commit murder, conspiracy to commit murder, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a firearm; after a jury trial he was convicted only of conspiracy to commit murder and acquitted of the other counts.
- The trial court denied Balbuena’s motion for judgment of acquittal; Balbuena appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of (1) an agreement to kill and (2) his specific intent to kill.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Balbuena's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there sufficient evidence of an agreement (conspiracy) to kill the victim? | Collective arrival, targeted vandalism, armed advance, verbal threats, pursuit, and shooting support an inference of a mutual plan to kill. | No express agreement; acts were coincidental or unconnected, so no proof of an agreement. | Yes. Circumstantial evidence (together arrival, targeted vandalism, weapons, taunts, pursuit, shooting) supported an inferred agreement. |
| Was there sufficient evidence of Balbuena’s specific intent to kill? | The group’s threats, armed pursuit, and shooting permitted the jury to infer Balbuena shared the intent to kill. | No evidence of motive or that Balbuena personally intended to kill; acquittals on substantive counts show lack of intent. | Yes. Intent can be inferred from conduct and participation in the armed, threatening pursuit and shooting. |
| Do acquittals on substantive charges (attempt, assault, firearm possession) render the conspiracy conviction inconsistent? | Conspiracy is distinct from substantive offenses; acquittal on substantive counts does not negate conspiracy. | Convictions should be consistent; finding conspiracy but not substantive guilt is inconsistent. | No inconsistency. Conspiracy targets agreement/process; substantive crimes require different elements. |
| Is this case controlled by Green (insufficient evidence due to inconsistent verdicts)? | Facts differ: here the group acted collectively as aggressors and Balbuena was tried separately from alleged co-conspirators. | Green shows similar group conduct and conflicting outcomes elsewhere, undermining conspiracy finding. | Distinguished. Green involved joint trial with inconsistent verdicts; here no inconsistent verdicts from the same jury and stronger collective-aggressor evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Taft, 306 Conn. 749 (2012) (armed aggressors acting in concert to pursue a victim can supply sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to kill)
- State v. Green, 261 Conn. 653 (2002) (insufficient conspiracy evidence where co-defendant acquitted in same trial, producing inconsistent verdicts)
- State v. Pond, 315 Conn. 451 (2015) (conspiracy and substantive crimes are separate; conspiracy conviction can stand even if substantive offense not proved)
- State v. Young, 157 Conn. App. 544 (2015) (arriving together, firing simultaneously, and fleeing together can support an agreement to commit an assault)
- State v. Crump, 43 Conn. App. 252 (1996) (circumstantial evidence probative for conspiracy)