421 P.3d 674
Haw. Ct. App.2017Background
- On Dec. 31, 2012, a 17‑year‑old (CW) was assaulted at a park; she sustained severe facial fractures, lacerations, genital and anal injuries; two males (Baker and GK) were involved.
- Baker was interviewed by HPD Detective Tokita on Jan. 8, 2013; Tokita read Miranda rights, Baker waived, and later made admissions to vaginal and anal penetration after persistent questioning. Tokita told Baker he had physical/DNA evidence though none existed.
- Baker was charged with two counts of first‑degree sexual assault (vaginal and anal penetration by strong compulsion) and one count of third‑degree sexual assault; the third‑degree count was dismissed pre‑trial for failure to allege nonmarriage.
- Pretrial, the court found Baker’s statement voluntary overall but ordered redaction of specific transcript pages and later excluded Baker’s remark "I've been raped as a kid" under HRE Rule 403.
- A jury convicted Baker on the two first‑degree counts; the court sentenced him to consecutive 20‑year terms (total 40 years). Baker appealed challenging voluntariness, the redaction/exclusion, consecutive sentencing, and a Sixth Amendment/Apprendi claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Baker) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Baker's Jan. 8, 2013 statement was voluntary | Statement was voluntary; waiver was valid and interrogation tactics did not overbear will | Statement was coerced by deception, badgering, and Baker's alleged intoxication/ADHD/withdrawal | Court affirmed voluntariness under totality of circumstances; detective's intrinsic deceptions considered but did not render statement involuntary |
| Whether the phrase "I've been raped as a kid" should be admitted | Phrase was low‑probative and highly prejudicial; exclusion proper under HRE 403 | Phrase shows Baker’s history and tends to negate propensity for committing violent sexual assault; exclusion violated right to present a complete defense | Court upheld exclusion: statement was vague, low probative value, risked unfair sympathy and confusion; other evidence allowed defense to contest strong‑compulsion element |
| Whether imposition of consecutive 20‑year terms abused discretion or was cruel and unusual | Consecutive terms appropriate given viciousness, seriousness, lack of remorse, deterrence, protection of public; court considered §706‑606 factors | Consecutive terms were excessive, failed to give adequate weight to Baker’s history, and disproportionate given mitigating circumstances | Court found sentencing within discretion and not cruel/unusual; judge properly weighed §706‑606 factors and did not abuse discretion |
| Whether a judge (not a jury) may find facts to impose consecutive sentences (Apprendi challenge) | Apprendi does not prohibit judicial factfinding for consecutive sentences; neither individual sentence exceeded statutory max | Baker argued Apprendi/Auld require jury findings for any facts that increase total exposure beyond statutory maximum for single count | Court rejected Apprendi challenge, following Kahapea and Oregon v. Ice; Auld is distinguishable (it addresses repeat‑offender findings), so judge may make factual findings to impose consecutive terms |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 849 P.2d 58 (1993) (police deception intrinsic to the offense is part of totality analysis and not per se coercive)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing prescribed penalty generally must be found by a jury)
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (States may allow judges to determine facts necessary to impose consecutive sentences)
- State v. Kahapea, [citation="111 Hawai'i 267, 141 P.3d 440"] (2006) (Hawai'i court upheld judge‑found facts for consecutive sentencing; Apprendi does not forbid judicial factfinding for consecutive terms)
- State v. Auld, [citation="136 Hawai'i 244, 361 P.3d 471"] (2015) (clarified that repeat‑offender sentencing under §706‑606.5 requires jury findings because it involves more than mere prior conviction)