State v. B. Hooper, 386 P.3d 548

On June 26, 2014, Britney Hooper entered 84-year-old Mrs. Blaz’s home under the pretext of selling magazines, assaulted her, threatened her with sewing shears, and demanded money. Mrs. Blaz suffered physical injury and thereafter became fearful and reclusive.
Hooper pleaded guilty on December 17, 2014, to aggravated burglary (felony), elder abuse (felony), and a licensing violation (misdemeanor).
On March 23, 2015, the court sentenced Hooper to 25 years with 10 years suspended for aggravated burglary, 10 years for elder abuse, and six months for the licensing violation, to run concurrently.
Hooper’s counsel did not object to convictions for both aggravated burglary and elder abuse; Hooper claimed this omission was ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.
Hooper also challenged the written judgment because it imposed $65 in surcharges/fees not pronounced at the oral sentencing.
The State conceded the fee error and the Court remanded to correct the judgment by removing the $65.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel’s failure to object to convictions for both aggravated burglary and elder abuse was ineffective assistance	State: the two crimes are distinct; no double jeopardy violation	Hooper: elder abuse is a "specific instance" of aggravated burglary; counsel should have objected	Court held not ineffective: the statutes have different elements (age element for elder abuse; occupied-structure/entry element for burglary), so both convictions permitted
Whether the written judgment’s fees exceeded the oral pronouncement	State conceded error on fees	Hooper: written judgment included $65 in surcharges not pronounced orally	Court remanded to district court to remove the $65 from the judgment

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-part ineffective assistance of counsel test: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. McQuiston, 277 Mont. 397, 922 P.2d 519 (Mont. 1996) (discusses when one offense is not a lesser-included offense of another because each statute requires distinct proof)