State v. Azevedo, 176 A.3d 1196

Background

On Jan. 28, 2008, a fire destroyed Amanda Azevedo’s home; she filed an insurance claim for over $1.2 million and investigations concluded the fire was intentionally set.
Azevedo and coconspirator Diniz Depina (Depina) had removed items from the house days before the fire; Depina later made multiple statements implicating Azevedo.
Depina gave (1) statements to insurer investigator Robert Corry and (2) deposition testimony in related civil litigation, and (3) out‑of‑court statements to two Bridgeport police officers (Rasuk and Angelo) at a memorial reception.
At trial the court initially admitted Depina’s statements to Corry for limited-purpose (that he said them) but later, after hearing extrinsic evidence, admitted Corry statements and the deposition substantively as coconspirator statements under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3(1)(D).
The court admitted Depina’s statements to the police officers as dual inculpatory statements under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6(4); Depina did not testify at trial (would have asserted the Fifth).
Azevedo was convicted of arson, attempts to commit insurance fraud and larceny, and related conspiracies; she appealed, arguing Confrontation Clause/hearsay errors and that use of cell‑site location records violated Conn. Const. art. I, § 7.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Azevedo)	Held
Admissibility of Depina’s statements to insurer Corry and his deposition under coconspirator exception (§ 8-3(1)(D))	Statements were verbal acts in furtherance of a conspiracy and thus non‑hearsay for truth purposes; admission did not implicate Crawford.	Statements were testimonial/hearsay and admission violated Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.	Court: Statements were admitted as verbal acts (not for truth) and were non‑testimonial; extrinsic evidence supported a conspiracy by a fair preponderance, so admission was proper.
Admissibility of Depina’s statements to Rasuk and Angelo as dual inculpatory statements (§ 8-6(4)) and Crawford waiver question	Statements were against Depina’s penal interest and trustworthy; defense effectively waived a Crawford objection; even if error, admission harmless in light of other evidence.	Statements were testimonial and admission violated Crawford; court abused discretion in treating them as dual inculpatory.	Court: Statements reasonably inculpated Depina and Azevedo, Depina was unavailable and statements bore indicia of reliability; admission as dual inculpatory was proper (or, if erroneous, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
Use of cell‑site location information (phone records) and Connecticut constitutional protection against unreasonable searches (art. I, § 7)	Record did not show state or state‑agent obtained the records; no state action shown so claim fails on record adequacy.	Admission violated article I, § 7 because phone records/location were obtained without proper state process.	Court: Record is inadequate — defendant failed to show state action (origin of subpoena unknown); claim not reviewable and fails.

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimony and police interrogation can be "testimonial" and trigger Confrontation Clause).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (further articulation of testimonial statements and emergency‑purpose exception).
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (statements against interest admissible if they bear adequate indicia of reliability; later clarified by Crawford).
State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 (2007) (coconspirator and dual‑inculpatory statement analysis under Conn. rules).
State v. Smith, 289 Conn. 598 (2008) (testimonial/hearsay threshold inquiries are questions of law reviewed plenarily).
State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785 (2005) (admission of statements for non‑truth purposes does not implicate Confrontation Clause).
State v. Foster, 293 Conn. 327 (2009) (Crawford not violated when statements admitted for non‑truth purpose).
State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (1989) (standards for unpreserved constitutional claims on appeal).