State v. Ayala
2012 ND 131
| N.D. | 2012Background
- Rubey was convicted of gross sexual imposition in 1988 and again in 1999 with additional child-sex offenses.
- Prior to completing a 12-year sentence, the State petitioned for civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3.
- On August 5, 2010, the district court committed Rubey as sexually dangerous after finding clear and convincing evidence.
- Rubey sought discharge; the district court held a hearing September 30, 2011 and received two expert reports.
- Experts agreed Rubey meets two of three statutory prongs but disagreed on likelihood of re-offense and seriousness of control problems.
- The district court, after weighing the experts, found clear and convincing evidence Rubey remains sexually dangerous; the court’s order was affirmed on appeal; a dissent framed different evidentiary grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether State proved Rubey remains sexually dangerous by clear and convincing evidence | State argues risk of re-offense and lack of control shown by experts. | Rubey argues lack of decisive current conduct and insufficient evidence of propensity to re-offend. | Yes; the court affirmed, finding clear and convincing evidence of continued danger. |
| Whether the district court’s findings complied with Rule 52(a) and due process requirements | State contends detailed findings supported by expert evidence; court weighed credibility as allowed. | Rubey contends findings were insufficient or non-specific about current behavior. | Yes; findings were adequate and not clearly erroneous under Crane and related standards. |
| Whether the decision is supported by the Crane due process standard | State relies on actuarial tools and history to show ongoing dangerousness. | Rubey argues actuarial results and past conduct do not prove current likelihood and control difficulty. | Held for State; record shows serious difficulty controlling behavior and likelihood of re-offense. |
| Whether age, treatment participation, and non-criminal factors negate risk assessment | State argues ongoing risk despite age or MS; treatment non-completion supports risk. | Rubey asserts age and condition undermine current danger; lack of recent harmful acts undermines likelihood. | No; district court properly weighed evidence and found ongoing risk. |
| Whether the district court's reliance on expert Lisota over Benson was proper | State’s expert more persuasive due to broader analysis beyond actuarial scores. | Rubey argues Benson’s analysis should have carried more weight. | Yes; court found Lisota’s broader approach more persuasive. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Rubey, 801 N.W.2d 702 (North Dakota 2011) (affirming commitment order; clear and convincing standard applied)
- Matter of E.W.F., 751 N.W.2d 686 (North Dakota 2008) (due process and ‘‘serious difficulty controlling behavior’’ standard)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (U.S. Supreme Court 2002) (due process threshold for risk of future dangerous conduct)
- Matter of R.A.S., 756 N.W.2d 771 (North Dakota 2008) (clarifies evidence requirements for sexually dangerous determinations)
- G.R.H., 758 N.W.2d 719 (North Dakota 2008) (describes nexus between disorder and dangerousness; Crane standard)
- Vantreece, 771 N.W.2d 585 (North Dakota 2009) (establishes modified clearly erroneous standard for review)