State v. Austin, 113 So. 3d 306

Defendant Austin was charged by indictment with 14 counts (9 possession of stolen things, 5 simple burglary) and pled not guilty.
Indictment was amended to proceed on counts 10, 12, 13, 14; jury found him guilty on those counts on July 27, 2011.
State filed a multiple offender bill; trial court found defendant to be a second felony offender, sentencing him to six years on each count, consecutive for a total of 24 years.
July 25, 2009 burglary spree involved four vehicles on Lakewood Dr. and Willowdale Blvd. in Luling; items from victims’ cars appeared in a crashed Lexus later identified as defendant’s vehicle.
Falcon testified defendant admitted involvement in vehicle burglaries; defendant denied them; Suhor identified the Lexus and some items; 2010–2011 detective interviews occurred; defendant gave a custodial statement after Miranda waiver.
The trial included issues about sufficiency of evidence, double jeopardy on retrial after mistrial, sentencing within statutory limits but challenged for excessiveness, and evidentiary issues including cell-phone records authentication and a suppression challenge to a statement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence	State	Austin argues insufficient proof of entry and specific intent and identity	Evidence sufficient to prove all elements beyond reasonable doubt
Double jeopardy and quash on retrial after mistrial	State	Double jeopardy bars second prosecution after mistrial caused by State conduct	No bar; mistrial legally ordered; second prosecution permissible
Excessiveness of consecutive sentences	State	Consecutive six-year terms may be excessive	Six-year terms within statutory range; not constitutionally excessive
Admission and authentication of Cherie Suhor's cell phone records	State	Records lacked proper authentication and violated confrontation	Records properly authenticated; not hearsay; confrontation rights not violated
Suppression of defendant's statement and invocation of counsel	State	Right to counsel invoked; statement suppressed	No unambiguous invocation of right to counsel; statement admissible

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1979) (sufficiency standard for evidence)
State v. Naquin, 61 So.3d 67 (La. App. 5th Cir., 2011) (proof of specific intent in simple burglary may be inferred)
State v. Johnson, 310 So.2d 600 (La.1975) (circumstantial evidence may establish entry)
State v. Ewens, 735 So.2d 89 (La. App. 5th Cir., 1999) (second offender sentencing guidance)
State v. Armstead, 432 So.2d 837 (La.1983) (telephone records authentication; non-hearsay nature of records)
State v. Carter, 762 So.2d 662 (La. App. 4th Cir., 2000) (telephone records authentication and confrontation considerations)
State v. Allen, 955 So.2d 742 (La. App. 5th Cir., 2007) (ambiguous invocation of right to counsel; Miranda)
State v. Smith, 839 So.2d 1 (La. 2003) (constitutional excessiveness review framework)
State v. Shaw, 969 So.2d 1233 (La. 2007) (15:529.1 sentencing in multiple offender context)
State v. Turner, 47 So.3d 455 (La. App. 5th Cir., 2010) (re sentencing in multiple offender context)