State v. Ashley, 299 Ga. 450

In 2012 Thad Lee Ashley was convicted of kidnapping a 7‑year‑old, attempting to kidnap her 3‑year‑old sister, and criminal trespass after an incident where he grabbed a girl from a minivan and tried to grab another; Ashley gave inconsistent statements and three taped interviews.
The State sought to admit three prior summer 2011 incidents at the same trailer‑park pool (leering at young girls; repeatedly touching a 10‑year‑old’s torso; repeatedly squirting a 5‑year‑old with a water gun) as similar‑transaction evidence under Georgia’s old Evidence Code.
The trial court admitted the pool incidents for purposes including intent and motive; the jury convicted and the court imposed lengthy sentences.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (4–3) reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion admitting the similar transaction evidence and that the error was not harmless. That court did not reach other claims.
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari, reviewed admissibility under the old Evidence Code, and reversed the Court of Appeals’ ruling as to admission of the similar‑transaction evidence, remanding for consideration of the other issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of prior pool incidents as similar‑transaction evidence	State: incidents show intent/motive/bent of mind toward young children and rebut Ashley’s claim of mistake or lack of intent	Ashley: pool incidents were non‑criminal or dissimilar and thus should not be used to infer criminal intent for the charged offenses	The Court: trial court did not abuse its discretion; two pool incidents probative of intent; leering incident admissible for motive/bent of mind (or harmless if improper)
Whether noncriminal prior acts can prove criminal intent	State: similar acts need not be criminal to be probative of intent	Ashley: using allegedly noncriminal acts to prove criminal intent is improper	The Court: intent is a mental state separable from criminality; prior noncriminal acts can nonetheless show intent or motive when sufficiently similar
Harmless error / prejudice from admitting prior acts	State: admission was proper and, in any event, any error was harmless given strong evidence	Ashley: admission was prejudicial and required reversal	The Court: even if one prior act (leering) were marginally probative on intent, it was admissible for other proper purposes and any error was harmless given other strong evidence

Pareja v. State, 286 Ga. 117 (addresses similarity requirement for similar‑transaction evidence)
Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22 (focus on similarities, not differences, in similar‑transaction analysis)
Alatise v. State, 291 Ga. 428 (prior acts need not mirror charged crime exactly to be admissible)
Chua v. State, 289 Ga. 220 (similar‑transaction evidence not limited to prior illegal conduct)
Smith v. State, 273 Ga. 356 (lesser similarity required to show motive/intent than to prove identity)
Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242 (standard of appellate review: abuse of discretion)
Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665 (example of admitting similar acts bearing on modus operandi or intent)
Matthews v. State, 294 Ga. 50 (harmless‑error framework for nonconstitutional errors)