State v. Ash
286 Neb. 681
| Neb. | 2013Background
- Vencil Leo Ash III was tried for first-degree murder for the 2003 killing of Ryan Guitron; jury convicted and sentenced to life; conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial.
- Victim’s remains found in 2010; ballistics linked shots to a .380 pistol purchased by Ash’s sister; eyewitness and co-defendant testimony (Kelly Meehan-Ash) conflicted with Ash’s account.
- Three days before trial, the State and Meehan-Ash reached a plea agreement in which she agreed to testify for a reduced charge; defense moved to continue when new, potentially impeaching material surfaced.
- Trial court denied continuance requests but allowed an immediate deposition of Meehan-Ash the evening before opening; defense claimed insufficient time to investigate new allegations (meth-induced hallucinations, inconsistent statements, and an out-of-state impeachment witness).
- Court admitted a pawn receipt showing Ash pawned the victim’s jacket 2 days before the murder over a Rule 404(2) objection; defense argued the receipt was improper bad-acts evidence and that no § 27-404(3) hearing occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Ash) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of continuance after late plea deal to call a codefendant violated defendant's right to prepare | Late endorsement did not require delay; court provided deposition and trial could proceed | Last-minute plea made Meehan-Ash a surprise witness; new impeachment/psychiatric issues required time to investigate and secure experts; continuance required | Court abused discretion by denying continuance; prejudice shown and relief reversible (new trial ordered) |
| Whether, given error, double jeopardy barred retrial | Evidence admitted at trial (taken as a whole) was sufficient to support conviction | Double jeopardy should bar retrial if conviction rests on improperly admitted or prejudicial procedures | Double jeopardy did not bar retrial: cumulative admitted evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction |
| Whether pawn receipt (pawning victim’s jacket 2 days before murder) was admissible despite Rule 404(2) | Receipt was inextricably intertwined with charged murder — part of the factual setting and probative of motive/premeditation | Receipt was improper other-acts evidence; State failed to show admissibility for proper purpose or hold required § 27-404(3) hearing | Admission was an abuse of discretion: pawn receipt was not inextricably intertwined and State failed to satisfy 404(2)/(3) protections; evidence likely inadmissible on retrial |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose exculpatory evidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality and prosecutor’s duty to disclose)
- State v. Kula, 252 Neb. 471 (1997) (late disclosure of investigative reports required continuance where material and prejudicial)
- State v. Freemont, 284 Neb. 179 (2012) (limits on inextricably intertwined exception to Rule 404(2))
- State v. Robinson, 271 Neb. 698 (2006) (inextricably intertwined/intrinsic-evidence principles under rule 404)
- State v. Sorensen, 283 Neb. 932 (2012) (Rule 404 and 403 admissibility framework)
