State v. Arreola
163 Wash. App. 787
Wash. Ct. App.2011Background
- Officer followed Chacon Arreola for about half a mile after a citizen report of a possible drunk driver, to observe for signs of impairment.
- Officer noticed a modified exhaust/muffler (noisemaker) and cited him for the muffler violation during the stop.
- No observed driving behavior suggesting intoxication; stop premised on investigating possible DUI and muffler infraction.
- Suppression hearing: officer testified primary motive was DUI investigation, with muffler as a secondary justification.
- Trial court denied suppression; found muffler violation was an actual reason yet not the sole reason for the stop.
- Court of Appeals held the stop was pretextual, reversed conviction, and directed dismissal with prejudice; dissent argued for deferment to fact-finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the stop pretextual under Art. I, §7? | Chacon Arreola argues primary motive was DUI investigation, muffler stop subordinated to that. | State contends muffler violation justifies stop; pretext is not shown given objective facts. | Stop was pretextual; unconstitutional |
| Do the trial court's findings support nonpretextual stop analysis? | Findings show primary DUI motive; muffler reason is secondary. | Findings credible; both motives present; not solely DUI-driven. | Findings support pretext conclusion |
| Does the muffler citation independently validate the stop under Ladson/Whren? | Muffler offense cannot validate a stop whose primary aim is DUI investigation. | Whren allows stop for observed traffic infractions to investigate related crimes. | No, not independent; stop lacked authority of law |
| If pretextual, what is the remedy for the resulting evidence? | Evidence obtained should be suppressed as fruit of unconstitutional stop. | Remedy not explicitly addressed; suppression may be warranted. | Conviction reversed and charges dismissed with prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Ladson v. State, 138 Wash.2d 343 (1999) (pretextual stops and driving-related investigations analyzed under Washington Constitution)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (police may stop for observed infractions to investigate crimes)
- State v. Nichols, 171 Wash.2d 370 (2011) (distinguishes speculative investigations unrelated to driving from driving-related stops)
- State v. DeSantiago, 97 Wash.App. 446 (1999) (pretextual stops and motives in context of driving-related investigations)
- State v. Myers, 117 Wash. App. 93 (2003) (stop for driving-related concerns can be scrutinized for pretextual motives)
- State v. Minh Hoang, 101 Wash.App. 732 (2000) (ambiguity in officer motive; consideration of whether the driving violation was the actual stop reason)
- State v. Montes-Malindas, 144 Wash.App. 254 (2008) (patrol context and timing of stop as factors in motive analysis)
- State v. Weber, 159 Wash.App. 779 (2011) (pretextual stop analysis and credibility of officer testimony)