State v. Arndt, 453 P.3d 696

Feb. 23, 2014 residential fire killed Darcy Veeder Jr.; eight people were in the house and others escaped.
Shelly Arndt was charged and convicted of aggravated first‑degree murder (with first‑degree arson aggravator), first‑degree arson, and related counts; sentenced to life without parole.
Four investigators (county fire marshal, an insurance investigator, a technical reviewer, and defense expert Dale Mann) analyzed origin/cause; Mann criticized Fire Marshal Lynam’s methods.
Trial court limited Mann’s testimony because he had not performed a full origin-and-cause investigation and had not followed NFPA 921/scientific method; Mann was allowed limited testimony about observations and methodology critiques.
Court of Appeals affirmed (one limited exclusion deemed erroneous but harmless); Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding the evidentiary limits were within the trial court’s discretion and that double jeopardy was not violated.
Justice Madsen dissented, arguing the exclusions deprived Arndt of her Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and that the murder/arson convictions should have merged under double jeopardy.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether limiting defense expert Mann’s testimony violated Arndt’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense	State: Limitations proper — Mann did not follow accepted methodology (NFPA 921/ER 702), so origin/causation opinions and certain tests were unreliable and irrelevant	Arndt: Mann was qualified to critique the State’s investigation; he need not conduct a separate origin/causation inquiry and exclusion shifted burden to defense	Court: Affirmed — trial court acted within its ER 702 gatekeeping discretion; two‑step review applied and constitutional right not violated because Mann could present substantial rebuttal evidence despite limits
Whether convictions for aggravated first‑degree murder (with first‑degree arson aggravator) and first‑degree arson violate double jeopardy	State: Legislature intended cumulative punishment; offenses have independent purposes/effects (life/people vs. property/multiple occupants) so no merger	Arndt (dissent): Aggravator and arson are the same in fact under Blockburger; aggravator functions as an element and should merge, so multiple punishments violate double jeopardy	Court: Affirmed — although Blockburger shows overlap, the merger exception for offenses with independent purposes/effects applies here; legislature intended separate punishments; Allen (on prosecutions/elements) does not bar multiple punishments in this context

State v. Clark, 187 Wn.2d 641 (2017) (two‑step review: abuse‑of‑discretion for evidentiary rulings; de novo for constitutional right to present a defense)
State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244 (1996) (expert testimony must satisfy Frye and ER 702)
Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d 909 (2013) (ER 702 excludes expert opinions that fail to adhere to reliable methodology)
State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713 (2010) (evidence of extremely high probative value may not be excluded consistent with the Sixth Amendment)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same‑evidence test for double jeopardy)
State v. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765 (2005) (four‑step double jeopardy analysis: legislative intent, Blockburger, merger doctrine, independent purpose/effect)
State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72 (2010) (legislature may authorize cumulative punishments; merger analysis guidance)
State v. Allen, 192 Wn.2d 526 (2018) (RCW 10.95.020 aggravators are elements for certain Sixth Amendment purposes; distinction between multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments discussed)
State v. Calle, 125 Wn.2d 769 (1995) (separate statutory locations and distinct purposes can indicate legislative intent to punish offenses separately)