939 N.W.2d 9
S.D.2020Background
- Defendant Joshua Armstrong, a state penitentiary inmate with prior felony sex convictions, mailed two letters (to PREA/Compass Center and the Governor) containing graphic threats to rape and kill a named mental-health therapist (C.H.).
- Compass Center staff read the envelope (per PREA routing), notified law enforcement, and the Division of Criminal Investigation interviewed Armstrong; he admitted authorship but denied an actual intent to harm.
- Armstrong was indicted under SDCL 22-22-45 (threatening to commit a sexual offense) and tried; the State introduced the letters and a stipulation of Armstrong’s prior convictions.
- At trial Armstrong moved for judgment of acquittal arguing the State failed to prove he "directly" threatened C.H.; the court denied the motion. Armstrong testified he wrote the letters to get grievances on record.
- Armstrong requested jury instructions that (1) the adverb "directly" modifies both "threatens" and "communicates," and (2) the crime is a "specific intent" offense; the court refused both instructions, the jury convicted, and Armstrong appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the adverb "directly" in SDCL 22-22-45 modify both "threatens" and "communicates" (affecting sufficiency)? | The State argued the two clauses are separate: the statute punishes either (1) a direct threat or (2) a communication of specific intent; "directly" modifies only "threatens." | Armstrong argued "directly" limits both verbs, so only communications delivered directly to the victim satisfy the statute; letters to third parties are insufficient. | Court: "directly" applies to "threatens" only; "communicates specific intent" is a separate, broader clause. The court affirmed denial of acquittal and refused Armstrong’s instruction. |
| Does SDCL 22-22-45 require "specific intent" (an intent beyond the act) or some mens rea? What mental state must the jury find? | The State argued the statute criminalizes the communication/issuance of a threatening communication and, like Elonis, requires a mens rea greater than negligence but not necessarily a traditional "specific intent"; objective effect on recipient plus subjective knowledge of the communicator is required. | Armstrong contended the statutory phrase "specific intent" mandates a specific-intent crime requiring an actual intent to commit the further felony sex offense. | Court: The statute does not create a traditional specific-intent offense. Read mens rea into the silent statute: the defendant must intend the physical act (issue/communicate the threat) and have subjective knowledge of the communication’s threatening character while an objective reasonable-recipient standard governs whether it is threatening. The court affirmed the jury instruction and rejected Armstrong’s requested "specific intent" instruction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (U.S. 2015) (federal court: when a threat statute is silent on mens rea, read in a mental-state requirement — purpose to threaten or knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat)
- State v. Draskovich, 904 N.W.2d 759 (S.D. 2017) (applies contextual/recipient-focused analysis for whether a statement is a threat)
- State v. Paulson, 861 N.W.2d 504 (S.D. 2015) (held threats may be communicated indirectly; distinguished on statutory text and facts)
- State v. C.C.H., 651 N.W.2d 702 (S.D. 2002) (considered whether threats were "communicated directly" in a First Amendment/true-threat context)
- State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468 (S.D. 1984) (explains difference and limits of "specific intent" vs. general intent terminology)
- State v. Bosworth, 899 N.W.2d 691 (S.D. 2017) (statutory-interpretation principle: disjunctive "or" can separate independent clauses and avoid surplusage)