State v. Armagost, 291 Neb. 117

Jacob D. Armagost was convicted by a jury of operating a motor vehicle in a willful, reckless manner to avoid arrest and sentenced as a habitual criminal to 10–14 years.
At trial Armagost requested a jury instruction defining “arrest” and objected that the elements instruction omitted an element requiring an attempt to arrest or issue a citation.
The district court refused the proposed definition and gave an elements instruction that tracked the statutory language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-905 without a separate attempted-arrest element.
The Nebraska Court of Appeals held the omission of an attempted-arrest element was error but harmless, and that the proposed definition was unnecessary.
The Nebraska Supreme Court granted further review to decide whether an attempted arrest or citation is an essential element of the offense and whether the court erred in refusing the arrest-definition instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an attempt to arrest or issue a citation is an essential element of the crime under § 28-905	Armagost: jury must be instructed that prosecution must prove an attempt to arrest or cite	State: the statutory language (“to avoid arrest or citation”) already implies the attempt; no separate element needed	Held: Not required as a separate element; instruction mirroring statute was sufficient
Whether the trial court erred in refusing Armagost’s proposed definition of “arrest”	Armagost: definition necessary so jury can determine if an attempt to arrest occurred	State: definition unnecessary and likely to confuse jurors because actual arrest is not required to convict	Held: Court did not err in refusing the definition; common understanding of “arrest” sufficed
Whether reliance on prior cases (Williams, Claussen) mandated a separate attempted-arrest element	Armagost: Court of Appeals properly relied on prior statements	State: prior cases were inapposite or overruled; statute controls elements	Held: Supreme Court rejected Court of Appeals’ reliance on Williams/Claussen for this instruction issue; statutory language governs elements
Whether omission of attempted-arrest instruction was reversible error	Armagost: omission was error and prejudicial	State: no error; if error, harmless because statute language was given	Held: No reversible error—elements instruction following statute was adequate

State v. Williams, 247 Neb. 931 (quoted for principle that statutory elements alone may be insufficient)
State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190 (overruled Williams on looking beyond statutory language; Legislature defines elements)
State v. Claussen, 276 Neb. 630 (addressed sufficiency of evidence regarding attempt to avoid arrest)
State v. Kass, 281 Neb. 892 (reiterates that jury instructions may mirror statutory language)
State v. Davlin, 272 Neb. 139 (same principle endorsing statutory-language instructions)
State v. Sanders, 269 Neb. 895 (same)
State v. Banks, 278 Neb. 342 (standard for reversible error from refusal to give requested instruction)