State v. Armadore, 338 Conn. 407

Background

Darius Armadore was convicted of murder; key evidence included historical cell site location information (CSLI) for his phone and two phones carried by his companion, Gerjuan (Tyus). Those CSLI records and related expert testimony were admitted at trial without objection.
After oral argument in the Appellate Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Carpenter v. United States (warrant required for historical CSLI). Armadore moved for leave to file a supplemental brief raising a Carpenter-based challenge; the Appellate Court summarily denied the motion.
The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction. Armadore sought (and this court granted) certification limited to (1) whether denial of leave to file the supplemental brief (raising Carpenter) was proper and (2) whether his hearsay objection to a witness’s testimony (Guilbert) was preserved and properly decided.
At trial, Guilbert testified he received a phone call telling him the victim had been shot; the prosecutor offered that testimony for its effect on Guilbert (to establish timing), and the court admitted it over a general objection.
This court held the Appellate Court abused its discretion by denying leave to supplement but deemed the error harmless under Golding prong four because (a) Armadore lacked standing to challenge Tyus’s CSLI, (b) Tyus’s CSLI and other evidence (ballistics, DNA, witness identifications, and the defendant’s admission to his girlfriend) strongly supported guilt, and (c) Guilbert’s testimony was admissible as nonhearsay (or harmless if erroneous).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Appellate Court should have allowed a supplemental brief raising a Carpenter claim announced after oral argument	Courts should liberally permit supplemental briefing when a new constitutional rule (Carpenter) is announced during pendency; Griffith retroactivity requires consideration	Appellate procedure requires issues be raised in the initial brief; failure to do so abandons the claim	Appellate Court abused discretion in denying leave, but error was harmless because the Carpenter claim failed under Golding prong four
Whether an unpreserved Carpenter claim is reviewable on appeal	Carpenter’s rule applies retroactively to pending cases; Golding permits review of unpreserved constitutional claims	Claim abandoned for not being in initial brief; procedural rules ordinarily bar review	Golding governs unpreserved constitutional claims; such claims generally warrant supplemental briefing and review, but still must satisfy Golding’s four prongs
Standing to challenge admission of a codefendant’s CSLI (Tyus’s CSLI)	Defendant contends evidence obtained from Tyus taints his trial and should be excluded when assessing harmlessness	State: Fourth Amendment rights are personal; Armadore lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in Tyus’s phones	Armadore lacked standing to challenge Tyus’s CSLI; courts may consider Tyus’s CSLI in harmless-error analysis
Whether Guilbert’s testimony about the phone call was inadmissible hearsay and whether error was preserved/harmless	Objected at trial; admission was hearsay because it was offered to prove the timing (truth) and prejudiced the defense	State: offered to show effect on hearer (nonhearsay) to place events on timeline; court and parties had fair notice of hearsay objection; alternatively harmless	Objection was functionally preserved; testimony admissible as nonhearsay to show effect on Guilbert (or, if erroneous, harmless given other timeline evidence and strong case against defendant)

Key Cases Cited

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (U.S. 2018) (historical CSLI generally requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment)
State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (Conn. 1989) (four‑prong test for appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
State v. Brown, 331 Conn. 258 (Conn. 2019) (applied Carpenter retroactively to pending state case involving CSLI)
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (U.S. 1987) (new constitutional rules apply to cases pending on direct review)
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (U.S. 1969) (Fourth Amendment rights are personal; one generally cannot assert another’s suppression claim)
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (U.S. 1948) (earlier decision on joint trials and suppression; limited application)
State v. Miguel C., 305 Conn. 562 (Conn. 2012) (statements offered to show their effect on the hearer are nonhearsay when relevant)