State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc.
389 P.3d 543
Wash.2017Background
- Barronelle Stutzman, owner of Arlene’s Flowers, refused to provide custom wedding floral services to Robert Ingersoll for his marriage to Curt Freed because the couple are same-sex; she cited sincerely held Southern Baptist beliefs that marriage is between a man and a woman.
- Ingersoll and Freed, and the State of Washington, sued under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60.215 (public accommodations) and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA); the trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and entered injunctive relief and damages.
- Stutzman defended that WLAD/CPA did not apply to her conduct and, alternatively, that application violated her federal and state constitutional rights: free speech, free exercise of religion, and freedom of association (and hybrid-rights doctrine).
- The trial court ruled (1) Stutzman violated WLAD’s public-accommodations prohibition and CPA, (2) both she and her corporation were liable, and (3) WLAD’s application did not violate her speech, free-exercise, association, hybrid-rights, or Washington article I, § 11 rights.
- The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review and affirmed: refusal to provide custom flowers for a same-sex wedding is discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation under the WLAD, and the WLAD, as applied, does not violate Stutzman’s asserted constitutional rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stutzman) | Defendant's Argument (State / Ingersoll & Freed) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether refusing wedding floral services to a same-sex couple constitutes discrimination "because of" sexual orientation under WLAD RCW 49.60.215 | Distinguish status (sexual orientation) from conduct (same-sex marriage); refusal based on marital status or religious objection, not sexual orientation | Status/conduct distinction fails; conduct of same-sex wedding is closely linked to sexual orientation and WLAD prohibits such discrimination in public accommodations | Refusal to provide custom wedding floral services to a same-sex couple is discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; WLAD violation affirmed |
| Whether WLAD contains an implicit exception for same-sex wedding services because same-sex marriage was not legally recognized in 2006 | Legislature could not have intended to cover same-sex wedding services when sexual-orientation protection was added while same-sex marriage was not recognized | No implied exception; statute’s language and existing explicit religious-organization exemption show no carve-out for wedding services | No same-sex wedding exception; statute applies to Stutzman and her corporation |
| Whether WLAD, as applied, violates First Amendment free speech (compelled speech) by forcing expressive artistic services | Floral arrangements are artistic, inherently expressive conduct; enforcement would compel endorsement of same-sex marriage; requests narrow exemption for expressive vendors | Sale of wedding flowers is commercial conduct, not inherently expressive; Spence/FAIR/Hurley distinctions support enforcement against public accommodations | WLAD does not compel speech as applied here; floral services are not inherently expressive in this context; free speech claim fails |
| Whether WLAD, as applied, violates free exercise (First Amendment and WA art. I, § 11) | WLAD is not neutral/generally applicable because it grants religious-organization exemptions and other statutory exceptions; strict scrutiny or balancing required; burden on conscience | WLAD is neutral and generally applicable as applied to public accommodations; exemptions do not evidence hostility to religion; even under strict scrutiny the State has compelling interest in eradicating discrimination | WLAD survives: under federal free-exercise analysis it's a neutral generally applicable law (rational basis); under state article I, § 11 the court assumed strict scrutiny and upheld WLAD as satisfying the standard |
| Whether WLAD, as applied, violates freedom of association or hybrid-rights doctrine | Enforcement infringes expressive association and creates a hybrid-rights claim (religion + speech/association) requiring strict scrutiny | Commercial public-accommodation context is not protected expressive association; speech and association claims fail so hybrid theory fails | Association and hybrid-rights claims rejected |
| Whether Stutzman may be personally liable (versus only corporate liability) under CPA for WLAD public-accommodations violation | She kept corporate form separate; responsible-corporate-officer doctrine inapplicable outside fraud; personal liability improper | Washington precedent permits personal CPA liability where individual participated in or approved the wrongful conduct; CPA defines "person" to include natural persons | Trial court rightly imposed personal liability because Stutzman personally committed/approved the discriminatory acts |
Key Cases Cited
- Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 162 Wn.2d 340 (Wash. 2007) (rejecting artificial status/conduct distinctions under WLAD)
- Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (comparable public-accommodations ruling rejecting status/conduct distinction for wedding services)
- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (U.S. 2015) (recognition that denying same-sex marriage imposes stigma and inequality)
- Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (U.S. 2006) (expressive-conduct test; commercial/administrative conduct not inherently expressive)
- Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (U.S. 1995) (parade as inherently expressive; limited to expressive contexts)
- Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (U.S. 1974) (two-part test for expressive conduct)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (U.S. 1993) (nonneutral law targeting religion triggers strict scrutiny)
- Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (U.S. 1990) (neutral generally applicable laws bear rational-basis review for free exercise claims)
- Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1983) (strict scrutiny can be satisfied for compelling governmental interest in eradicating discrimination)
- Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (U.S. 2000) (expressive association protects membership organizations, distinct from commercial public accommodations)
- Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (U.S. 1984) (limits on associational claims where antidiscrimination enforcement does not impair expressive activity)