State v. Arizola
295 Neb. 477
| Neb. | 2017Background
- On June 18, 2014, Officer Villamonte ran a vehicle plate, learned the registered owner was Felix Arizola, and pulled alongside the vehicle at a stoplight, positively identifying Arizola as the driver from department photographs. Villamonte then initiated a traffic stop and requested ID.
- Records checks showed Arizola’s operator’s license was revoked and disclosed prior DUI and driving-suspension convictions. After stepping out, Arizola smelled of alcohol; officers found a nearly empty beer bottle on the driver’s floorboard. Arizola was arrested for driving on a revoked license and later refused a breath test.
- Arizola was charged with refusal of a chemical test with two prior DUI convictions (Class IIIA felony). He filed pretrial motions to suppress the stop, motions to quash, and later pleaded not guilty; he was convicted on stipulated facts.
- The district court denied suppression (crediting officer identification), denied plea-in-abatement and motions to quash, and rejected vagueness/double-jeopardy challenges. At sentencing the court applied Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.09 to deny probation, relying on a certified county-court file showing a March 2014 DUI matter pending when the June 2014 offense occurred.
- Arizola appealed, arguing (1) the stop lacked reasonable suspicion, (2) statutes and enhancements were unconstitutionally vague or violated double jeopardy/due process, and (3) § 60-6,197.09 was unconstitutional or was applied without adequate opportunity for him to challenge the predicate proceeding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Arizola) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of traffic stop / suppression | Officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion and could not reliably identify driver; stop should be suppressed | Officer identified Arizola from DMV/book-in photos and had license-revoked info—stop was lawful | Court upheld stop; trial court credited officer ID and found reasonable suspicion (denied suppression) |
| Double jeopardy / plea in bar; charging/enhancement theory | Using refusal both as the predicate offense and as an enhancement/element violates double jeopardy and due process | Enhancement derives from prior offenses/habitual-offender provisions, not double punishment for the same element | Rejected Arizola’s double-jeopardy and related challenges; plea in bar and motions to quash denied |
| Vagueness / overbreadth of statutory scheme (§§ 60-6,197.02; 60-6,197.03(6)) | Statutory language is vague/overbroad (unclear terms and penal consequences) | Statutory terms are ordinary, have common meaning, and prior precedent upholds similar language | Court held statutes not unconstitutionally vague; overbreadth not preserved for review |
| Constitutionality / procedural due process re: § 60-6,197.09 (denial of probation) | § 60-6,197.09 uses vague terms; Arizola was denied meaningful evidentiary opportunity to dispute whether another DUI proceeding was pending/committed | Statute’s terms have plain meaning; sentencing court may rely on PSI and certified records; defendant had opportunity to rebut and did not do so | Court upheld § 60-6,197.09 as constitutional and found sentencing procedure adequate where PSI included certified county-court record; denial of probation affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. v. Chartier, 772 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2014) (discusses when officer reliance on registration/ownership information can justify a stop)
- State v. Woldt, 293 Neb. 265 (Nebr. 2016) (standards for appellate review of suppression rulings and reasonable-suspicion/probable-cause review)
- State v. Lamb, 280 Neb. 738 (Nebr. 2010) (interpreting phrase "participating in criminal proceedings" in § 60-6,197.09 and rejecting vagueness challenge)
- State v. Long, 264 Neb. 85 (Nebr. 2002) (defining "proceeding" and its application in criminal contexts)
- State v. Irons, 254 Neb. 18 (Nebr. 1997) (void-for-vagueness principles for penal statutes)